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IMPUTATION POLICIES AND COMPETITION
If Bell [of Pennsylvania] can offer lower toll rates because it
has operating efficiencies which its competitors or soon-to-be com-
petitors do not, then it should be allowed to reflect those efficien-
cies in its rates. That is what competition is about. As the [Business
User's Group] noted, it would be a [sic] anomalous result indeed, if
the result of divestiture and [interexchange carrier] competition is
artificially higher prices to toll customers. Competition was intro-
duced to benefit customers, not [interexchange carriers].... There-
fore, we reject the proposed requirement that [Bell of Pennsylvania]
artificially impute carrier access charges to itself in establishing its
intraLATA MTS and WATS rates.'
Introduction
Imputation Policies in Telecommunications Regulation
Imputation is a regulatory policy sometimes employed in tele-
communications when a local exchange carrier (e.g., Pacific Bell, Bell-
South, GTE) is the primary supplier (or wholesaler) of intermediate
productive inputs required for a service sold in an end-user (retail, or
downstream) market. Perhaps the best example of a telecommunica-
tions imputation policy is access charge imputation, which is the prac-
tice of ensuring that a local exchange carrier (LEC) charges itself
access charges when supplying intrastate intraLATA2 long distance
service to individual consumers while at the same time selling access
services to its own downstream competitors, who provide end-users
with the same service.3 Access charge imputation in telecommunica-
tions regulation is required by state public utility commission orders,4
1. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n v. Bell Tel. Co., 60 Pa. Util. Comm'n 435 (1985)
(citations omitted).
2. IntraLATA long distance consists of' long distance calls that both originate and
terminate within one of the local access and transport areas (LATAs) defined by the Modi-
fication of Final Judgment (MFJ). Regional Bell Operating Companies such as Pacific
Telesis, BellSouth, and Ameritech are confined to providing long distance within LATAs.
3. "Access services" are telephone network services purchased by long distance carri-
ers (usually known as interexchange carriers, or IXCs) to connect to the local telephone
customers of the LECs. To complete a long distance call from Point A to Point B, a long
distance company such as AT&T, Sprint, or MCI can purchase access services from LECs
to use in conjunction with their own telephone networks. Thus, to service the end user
who purchases long distance service from a long distance company, IXCs can purchase
what are known in economics as "upstream" productive inputs (i.e., access services) to
provide service to end users (comprising the "downstream" market) who place long dis-
tance calls from Point A to Point B. Access charge imputation, thus, is a practice that seeks
to ensure that LECs do not use their control of access services in the upstream market to
harm competition or disadvantage competitors in the downstream market. This will be
discussed in more detail in the following material.
4. In re SB 2320 - Subsidy Investigation, 132 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 121, 143
(1992) (ordering the local exchange carriers, when pricing their own services, to impute to
themselves the same access charges billed to competitors); In re IntraLATA Toll Competi-
tion, 131 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 205, 208 (1992) (ordering that long distance rates must
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cover costs, including imputed access charges in the case of the primary LEC, Southern
Bell Telephone & Telegraph Company); In re South Cent. Bell Tel. Co., 132 Pub. Util. Rep.
4th (PUR) 190, 190 (1992) (requiring that additional reductions to intraLATA long dis-
tance rates be consistent with the imputation of access charges and other relevant costs); In
re South Cent. Bell Tel. Co., 127 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 1, 17 (1991) (directing LECs to
include in their intraLATA rates the same level of access charges assessed to the IXCs and
the resellers); In re Washington Util. & Transp. Comm'n v. Pacific Northwest Bell Tel. Co.,
120 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 381, 381 (1990) (approving rates that include an imputed
access charge component to ensure fair competition between the LEC and other firms
providing voice message and call answering services); In re Pacific Northwest Bell Tel. Co.,
114 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 299, 312 (1990) (ordering that Pacific Northwest Bell's long
distance rates cover imputed tariffed access charges plus at least the incremental cost of
interexchange facilities); In re IntraLATA Interexchange Telecomm. Mkts., 113 Pub. Util.
Rep. 4th (PUR) 272, 276-77 (1990) (determining that access charges should be imputed to
an intraLATA interexchange telecommunications provider on a service-by-service basis,
but that it was not necessary to impute access charges on a service element or time-differ-
entiated basis); In re Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 109 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 107, 136 (1989)
(holding that imputation of telephone access charges using fully allocated embedded costs
on a category-of-service basis was appropriate for use in a proceeding to provide for a
steady controlled transition to a competitive intrastate telecommunications market); In re
New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 106 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 1, 12 (1989) (ruling that the
volume-based, discount long distance rate plans offered by the dominant local exchange
telephone carrier must reflect an imputed originating access charge); In re Exchange Car-
rier Toll Rates, 94 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 309, 325 (1988) (ordering that local service
companies should impute access charges into long distance rates; imputation should take
place even when "competitive bypass opportunities" exist; access charges should be im-
puted at tariffed rates for all services used by a local services company in provision of its
interexchange services; local transport charges should be imputed based on the distance
from the central office to the tandem for calls routed through a tandem; and charges for
other services, such as billing and collection services, also should be imputed at the rates
charged to other carriers); In re Washington Util. & Transp. Comm'n v. Pacific Northwest
Bell Tel. Co., 93 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 430,440 (1988) (ordering that rates charged for
intraLATA long distance telephone service offered by a local exchange carrier at volume-
based discounts should include imputed access charges equal to the charges assessed to
other interexchange carriers; the imputed charges should include both nontraffic-sensitive
and traffic-sensitive costs; and network access and local transport should be imputed at
current tariff rates, while billing and collection may be imputed at long-run incremental
cost because the carrier does not provide billing and collection service to other carriers in
connection with their long distance discount plans); In re IntraLATA Access Charges, 86
Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 319, 320 (1987) ("To assure that a telephone company that acts
as both an intraLATA toll carrier and a local exchange carrier does not, through manipula-
tion of its toll rate, unreasonably shift costs away from toll to inelastic basic local services,
the board will impute to the carrier's total toll revenue the amount of access charges it
would have charged others for the origination and termination of traffic over its facili-
ties."). But see Public Util. Comm'n v. AT&T Communications, 777 S.W.2d 363, 363 (Tex.
1989) ("Access charges implemented by Public Utility Commission were not unreasonably
discriminatory in not imputing access charge on local exchange companies or treating local
exchange companies as customers of themselves."); Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n v.
Bell Tel. Co., 60 Pa. Util. Comm'n 435 (1985).
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state statutes,5 and a Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
order.6
Imputation policies may be described in two equivalent ways.
First, such policies require regulatory agencies to select (via regulatory
review, not the direct setting of prices) an internal price of the inter-
mediate productive good that a vertically integrated supplier7 must
implicitly charge itself (or impute to itself) when using this intermedi-
ate good as an input in servicing the downstream or end-user market.
Essentially, imputation policies require public utility regulatory agen-
cies to set transfer prices8 for intermediate productive inputs, such as
access services. Imputation is a practice in which an LEC must sell to
itself access to the local exchange network at the same rates it charges
its intraLATA long distance competitors. In other words, in setting
rates charged to end-users it must impute to itself the same tariffed
access charges that other suppliers of intraLATA long distance must
pay to gain access to local exchange subscribers.' A common example
of an imputation policy is the practice of ensuring that an LEC
charges itself access charges when selling access services to in-
traLATA long distance carriers, and supplying intrastate intraLATA
long distance service directly to end-users itself.
Second, an equivalent description of an imputation policy is that
it sets regulation-enforced price floors for end-user services, such as
5. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 62-609 (1992) ("A telephone corporation, which provides
basic local exchange service, and which also provides message telecommunications service
shall impute to itself its prices of special access or private line access and switched access
for the use of essential facilities used in the provision of message telecommunications ser-
vice, special access or private line access services and WATS service or their equivalents.");
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 484.2311 (1991) ("A telecommunication provider of both basic local
exchange service and toll service shall impute to itself its prices of special access and
switched access for the use of essential facilities it uses in the provision of toll, WATS, or
other service for which access is a component."); 16 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 237.60, subd. 4
(Supp. 1992) ("If a telephone company provides both local service and long distance serv-
ices, that company shall, in determining the cost of the long distance service, include at
least the same level of contribution to common and joint costs as is contained in the access
charges to other telephone companies.").
6. The FCC ordered the imputation of access charges for interstate intraLATA serv-
ices and corridor services in 1985. See In re Application of Access Charges to the Origina-
tion and Termination of Interstate, IntraLATA Services and Corridor Services,
Memorandum Opinion and Order, F.C.C. 85-172, at 9-11 (Apr. 12, 1985).
7. A vertically integrated firm is one with activities that extend over more than one
successive stage of the production process of transforming raw materials into final goods or
services. The commonly cited motive for vertical integration is the elimination of prohibi-
tory transaction costs.
8. In economics, a transfer price is the price used for internal sales of goods and
services between the divisions or semi-autonomous profit centers of a business enterprise.
9. This statement is generally true, though imputation may take several different
forms.
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intraLATA long distance. Essentially, access charge imputation is
nothing more than a prescribed price floor for intraLATA long dis-
tance service, one that includes the incremental cost of intraLATA
long distance as well as another element, such as the tariffed rate of
access to the network, as one of its components. In other words, an
imputation policy may require an amount to be "imputed" to a ser-
vice, meaning that in practice its price floor consists of its own incre-
mental cost and the amount of imputation. This is equivalent to an
explicit price floor for the end-user service.
Why Imputation Policies Are Applied
In state telecommunications regulation, potential LEC competi-
tors often argue that imputation policies are necessary to achieve full
competition in telecommunications markets. For example, they argue
that access charge imputation is necessary to protect contemplated in-
trastate intraLATA long distance competition.10 Potential LEC com-
petitors assert that imputation of interconnection rates is a necessary
adjunct to policies such as expanded interconnection or collocation"
because imputation is considered a necessary safeguard against poten-
tial cross-subsidization or anticompetitive price squeeze practices by
the LEC.12
10. Craig D. Dingwall, Imputation of Access Charges-A Prerequisite for Effective In-
traLATA Toll Competition, 40 ADMIN. L. REV. 433,434 (1988); Mark Sievers, The Law and
Economics of IntraLATA Competition: 1+ Issues and Access Charge Imputation, COMPETI-
TION AND THE REGULATION OF UTILITIEs 7 (M. A. Crew ed., 1991). See also In re South
Cent. Bell Tel. Co., 127 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 1, 17 (1991) ("If increased intra-LATA
competition is authorized, it should be done on an equitable basis. The only way to ensure
that result is to require the LECs to impute to its own price of toll service the same carrier
access rate charged to other carriers. This imputation will prevent monopoly leveraging by
the LECs and ensure that the contribution from access is not lost or shifted to other mo-
nopoly offerings.").
11. Petitioner's Brief for the Texas Public Utility Commission, In re Amendment of
the Substantive Rules to Promote Competition in Local Telephone Services, at 25 (Petition
for Rulemaking) (Jan. 6, 1993).
12. See, e.g., In re Regulatory Frameworks for Local Exch. Carriers, 125 Pub. Util.
Rep. 4th (PUR) 260, 285 (1991). It is often the case that intervenors who compete with the
LECs in any downstream market raise the specter of price squeezes and anticompetitive
pricing. See, e.g., In re IntraLATA Toll Competition, 122 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 565,
585 (1991) ("AT&T, MCI, and other parties contend that the LECs should be required to
impute access charges in pricing intraLATA toll services. It is their belief that imputation is
necessary to prevent the LECs from obtaining an unfair price advantage vis-a-vis other toll
carriers."); In re Chesapeake Potomac Tel. Co., 1990 Md. P.S.C. LEXIS 168, 2 ("In the
absence of an access charge imputation requirement for [Chesapeake & Potomac's] MTS
service, MCI believes [Chesapeake & Potomac] will have the ability and incentive to en-
gage in 'price squeezes' and will also be motivated to offer optional toll calling plans, based
on time and/or volume commitments, that price [Chesapeake & Potomac's] MTS service to
end users below the access charges levied on interexchange carriers."); In re Pacific North-
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A price squeeze is an alleged anticompetitive pricing practice that
takes place when the vertically integrated input supplier charges a
high price for the input to its downstream competitors 13 while charg-
ing a low price for the competitive downstream service, hence squeez-
ing the profit margin out of the downstream market, as well as
squeezing out downstream competitors. The vertically integrated firm
implicitly charges itself much less for the input than it charges its own
competitors. It thereby increases its competitors' cost of doing busi-
ness by raising prices on necessary upstream productive inputs, and
simultaneously dampens the price the competitors can achieve by sell-
ing services at low prices in the downstream market. Hence, down-
stream competitors may decide to exit the market after experiencing a
squeeze of profit margins.
Imputation policies are designed to guard against such pricing
tactics. The overarching goal of an imputation policy is to preclude
anticompetitive pricing practices such as the price squeeze by altering
the vertically integrated firm's incentives to engage in such practices.
An imputation policy purportedly deals with price squeeze incentives
by seeking to impede the vertically integrated firm's ability to engage
in a price spread between upstream and downstream services. It ac-
complishes this by ensuring that upstream rates are somehow imputed
as costs to create downstream price floors. In this way, the vertically
integrated firm cannot price the downstream service independently of
the price downstream competitors must pay for upstream productive
inputs. Thus, state regulatory agencies may pursue imputation poli-
cies to ensure fair competition in state telecommunications markets.
From an economic perspective, an effective imputation policy
should make a vertically integrated, regulated firm indifferent to sell-
ing in the upstream (wholesale) market or the downstream (retail)
market, while preserving the economies inherent in vertical integra-
tion. This Article argues that some imputation policies can succeed in
achieving this goal, while others cannot. Further, since public utility
west Bell Tel. Co., 114 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 299, 304-05 (1990) ("MCI argues that
firms which appear to compete with [Pacific Northwest Bell] are, in fact, dependent com-
petitors. Dr. Cornell states: [Pacific Northwest Bell] has strong incentives to try to impede
or prevent [competing firms] from ever becoming effective competition, and its control
over the bottleneck local exchange monopoly gives it the ability to act on its incentives. It
can engage in three kinds of anticompetitive behavior: 1) putting its potential competitors
under a price squeeze; 2) anticompetitively offering lower rates for monopoly offerings
only when the consumer also takes potentially competitive offerings from [Pacific North-
west Bell] rather than from another provider; or 3) cross subsidizing its potentially compet-
itive offerings by its monopoly ones.").
13. That is, those who purchase productive inputs in the wholesale market from a
competitor in the retail market.
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law normally regulates upstream prices, the pricing incentives that im-
putation policies attempt to foster may already exist without the im-
plementation of a specific policy.
Issues Similar to Price Squeeze Concerns and Imputation in Antitrust
The issues behind using imputation policies as safeguards against
price squeezes are not novel. General concerns about vertical integra-
tion, vertical foreclosure (i.e., the exclusion that results when
unintegrated downstream rivals are foreclosed from the input supplies
controlled by the integrated firm), and undue price discrimination are
not new and have not been confined to regulated industries, the tele-
communications industry, public utility regulation, or antitrust. 14
United States v. Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Ry. Co.,15 decided in 1936,
was an early case in which a vertical relationship between a railroad
and U.S. Steel violated the so-called "commodities clause" of the In-
terstate Commerce Act adopted in 1906. The price discrimination
concerns in this case emanated from the fact that U.S. Steel controlled
a 195-mile railroad serving the Chicago area, and U.S. Steel subsidiar-
ies accounted for sixty percent of the railroad's business.' 6 A well-
known case, United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am. (Alcoa),'7 decided
in 1945, involved a vertically integrated firm that was suspected of
monopolizing aluminum fabrication in violation of § 2 of the Sherman
Act. In Brown Shoe Co. v. United States,18 the U.S. Supreme Court
unanimously declared illegal the Brown Shoe Company's 1956 acqui-
sition of G. R. Kinney Company due to concerns of market power
resulting from a vertical merger. The Justice Department once distin-
guished between vertical mergers of the Brown Shoe variety and hori-
zontal mergers, though it no longer makes this distinction.19
14. Such concerns often are encountered in the regulation of electric utilities. See, e.g.,
In re Southern Cal. Edison Co., 112 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 448, 448 (1990) ("In review-
ing price squeeze allegations, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission first determines
whether there is price discrimination and then whether such discrimination is likely to pro-
duce anticompetitive effects; if both discrimination and anticompetitive effects are found a
price squeeze is said to exist and a presumption arises that rates are unduly discriminatory;
the presumption is then balanced against countervailing public policy or factual circum-
stances, if any exist, to rebut the presumption or assist in formulating an appropriate
remedy.").
15. 298 U.S. 492 (1936).
16. Id.; see generally Louis B. SCHWARTZ ET AL., FREE ENTERPRISE AND ECONOMIC
ORGANIZATION: GOVERNMENT REGULATION 741-42 (6th ed. 1985).
17. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
18. 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
19. See, e.g., 1968 Department of Justice Merger Guidelines, reprinted in 2 TRADE
REG. REP. (CCH) 4510 (1968). See also U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade
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In addition, antitrust litigation against electric power companies
has been common in the past because of price squeeze concerns,
though in only one case 20 did a court actually enter, or affirm, a judg-
ment against a defendant. 2' There is extremely little case law holding
that a public utility price squeeze is an exclusionary practice. Further,
the trend of antitrust litigation against electric power companies be-
cause of price squeeze allegations may be ending for legal reasons
(and probably should have previously ended for economic reasons).22
The recent handling of price squeeze cases in the courts offers
several valuable lessons for regulatory policy, and raises serious ques-
tions about the quality of economic arguments behind imputation pol-
icies, creating doubt regarding the value of such policies.
The Objectives of This Article
This Article draws on economics literature and antitrust case law
to provide an analysis and critique of imputation policies in telecom-
munications regulation. Section I provides an economic analysis of
the reason usually advanced for having imputation policies-the price
squeeze as an anticompetitive pricing strategy. Section I employs two
economic models of the vertically integrated firm to provide a rigor-
ous anatomy of the price squeeze and its implications for imputation
policies. This section further discusses the economic properties of reg-
ulatory constraints in telecommunications regulation, and concludes
that these properties are sufficient to prevent the types of pricing
practices that imputation policies are designed to prevent. Section II
covers the relatively sophisticated economic arguments that were ad-
Commission Horizontal Merger Guidelines, reprinted in 4 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 13,
104 (1992).
20. See City of Mishawaka v. American Elec. Power Co., Inc., 616 F.2d 976 (7th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1096 (1981).
21. Most price squeeze litigation has taken place in the electric power industry since
the Supreme Court's decision in Conway. Federal Power Comm'n v. Conway Corp., 426
U.S. 271 (1976).
22. As one author noted:
The great quantity of litigation motivated by concerns about 'price squeezes' in
particular and retail market competition in general has had no positive efficiency
consequences; it is at best a waste of time and litigation expense and at worst a
source of inefficiency. In reality, application of the antitrust laws to the electric
utility industry has had little to do with competition. Primarily it reflects conflicts
between public and private firms and efforts to use the threat of antitrust litiga-
tion to exact rate concessions in regulatory proceedings and force low-cost suppli-
ers to share their resources with less efficient firms.
Paul L. Joskow, Mixing Regulatory and Antitrust Policies in the Electric Power Industry:
The Price Squeeze and Retail Market Competition, ANTITRUST AND REGULATION: ESSAYS
IN MEMORY OF JOHN J. McGOWAN 173, 174-75 (Franklin M. Fisher ed., 1985).
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vanced by the court in Town of Concord2 3 regarding the efficacy of
price squeeze strategies by regulated firms. Unlike the orders issued
by state public utility commissions, the Concord court found regula-
tion to restrain a firm's ability to engage in a successful price squeeze.
Section III provides a detailed discussion of cost-based price
floors, demonstrating that in the presence of a regulatory constraint
on the price of intermediate upstream productive inputs, a regulated
firm has no incentive to ignore the true opportunity costs of selling
downstream services such as intraLATA long distance. Imputation
policies may duplicate existing incentives of the regulated firm, and
may therefore be a needless and costly addition to regulation. Section
IV questions the efficacy of imputation policies as price floors to
guard against predatory pricing tactics, using arguments from the
microeconomics literature. Finally, Section V summarizes and offers
policy recommendations.
This Article concludes that imputation is an excessively stringent
safeguard against alleged anticompetitive price squeeze practices, the
likelihood of which may be quite small in the first place. Imputation
policies may actually do more to hamper earnest competition on the
merits than to foster it. They may cause regulatory price floors to be
too high to allow the legitimate competitive responses of vertically
integrated LECs (which may have significant productive efficiencies
due to scale and scope economies). Imputation policies, if perpetu-
ated in economically inefficient ways in important future public poli-
cies (e.g., collocation or unbundling in state telecommunications
regulation), may cause public policy-makers to ignore the economic
efficiencies inherent in vertically integrated LECs to the detriment of
true competition, and ultimately to the detriment of telecommunica-
tions customers.
I
Lessons From Economic Theory:
The Anatomy of a Price Squeeze
A. Introduction
State public utility commissions often raise the specter of an an-
ticompetitive price squeeze or vertical price squeeze.24 As the intro-
23. Town of Concord v. Boston Edison Co., 915 F.2d 17 (1st Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
499 U.S. 931 (1991).
24. See, e.g., In re Competition for Intrastate Interexchange Telecomm. Servs., 101
Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 346, 384 (1989) (opining that an LEC freed from regulation
could engage in a price squeeze). Most often, however, this argument is raised by firms
that compete with an LEC in a downstream market, such as an interexchange carrier that
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duction to this Article suggests, a price squeeze is usually
characterized as a strategy that could be employed by a firm that sup-
plies upstream productive inputs (as a wholesaler) to other firms for
their use in selling in a downstream, or retail market, and competes
with those same firms in that downstream market.25 Recall that the
price squeeze, in simple terms, consists of a pricing plan in which the
price squeezer allegedly charges high wholesale prices and low retail
prices, thereby squeezing the profits of the competing retailers and
eventually eliciting their exit from the downstream market. It has also
been characterized as a pricing plan in which the price squeezer sim-
ply charges high prices to its own competitors in the wholesale mar-
ket, with the same result.
As an example, consider the following hypothetical scenario. An
LEC, Picard & Riker Exchange Telephone Co., sells access service
(i.e., access to its switched network connecting local customers) to
long distance carriers. The long distance carriers need this access to
the network to offer all their long distance services, including in-
traLATA long distance. Assume in this simple illustrative example
that the long distance carriers can gain access to local exchange sub-
scribers only through Picard & Riker. Picard & Riker, however, also
offers intraLATA long distance, and uses its own network to provide
itself access to final customers. Given this arrangement, the essential
question behind an imputation policy is whether Picard & Riker
would have an incentive to foreclose competition in the intraLATA
toll market (by charging such high rates for access to the network that
no long distance carrier can make a profit selling intraLATA toll).
Imputation policies are used to guard against an anticompetitive
price squeeze by altering the vertically integrated firm's incentives to
engage in one. An imputation policy purportedly deals with price
squeeze incentives by seeking to impede the vertically integrated
carries intrastate intraLATA long distance calls. For discussions of access charge imputa-
tion proposals raised by interexchange carriers and other intervenors, see In re Alternative
Regulatory Frameworks for Local Exch. Carriers, 107 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 1, 25
(1989) ("MCI recommends that the Commission establish effective market rules to control
the local exchange carriers' incentives and ability to engage in price squeezes and discrimi-
natory bundling of services. The major market rules would be (1) mandatory unbundling
of bottleneck services or building blocks from nonbottleneck services or building blocks,
(2) mandatory offering of all bottleneck services or building blocks at uniform prices on a
non-discriminatory basis, and (3) requiring that the rate structure of bottleneck building
blocks correspond to costs.").
25. Several definitions have been advanced for a price squeeze. See, e.g., In re Con-
struction Work in Progress, 108 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 280,280 (1989) (defining a price
squeeze as "a situation in which a utility that sells power at both wholesale and retail is
able to force its wholesale customers out of the retail market by raising wholesale prices to
a level where the wholesale customer is inhibited from competing at the retail level").
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firm's ability to unreasonably shrink the price spread between up-
stream and downstream services. It accomplishes this by ensuring that
upstream rates are imputed to downstream price floors. In this way,
the vertically integrated firm cannot price the downstream service in-
dependently of the price downstream competitors must pay for up-
stream productive inputs, such as access services.
From a regulatory agency perspective, an effective imputation
policy should make a vertically integrated, regulated firm indifferent
to either selling in the upstream (wholesale) market or the down-
stream (retail) market, while preserving the economies inherent in
vertical integration. Whether such a policy makes any sense depends
entirely on whether a price squeeze itself is a credible practice. A
price squeeze is not likely a sensible economic practice or a predatory
tactic. Further, pricing techniques that may appear to be prima facie
price squeeze tactics are not necessarily anticompetitive or economic
welfare-reducing. A complete understanding of the value of imputa-
tion policies requires a recognition of what a price squeeze is in rigor-
ous economic terms.
The price squeeze scenario often recounted in a regulatory pro-
ceeding is largely anecdotal and amounts more to economic fiction
than to fact, though there are theoretical models of vertically inte-
grated firm behavior in which a strategy of forward integration and
price discrimination could increase a vertically integrated firm's prof-
its. These latter practices, however, are not necessarily inimical to the
public interest (or anticompetitive) because they can foster economic
efficiency.26 Whether such practices are inimical to customers or not,
the economic and institutional conditions required to make such for-
ward integration and price discrimination either likely or profitable
are quite remote to regulated telecommunications markets, making
the prospect of a price squeeze more of a distant, nonrigorous cousin
of a strictly theoretical construct than behavior likely observed in real
industrial markets. As subsequently argued in this Article, this latter
point is particularly salient with respect to modern telecommunica-
tions markets, especially considering that the upstream firms are
highly regulated.
26. Perry was the first to demonstrate the conditions under which a monopolist in an
intermediate input market could vertically integrate so as to maximize its profits, resulting
in an unprofitably narrow differential between input prices and prices charged to custom-
ers in a downstream market. This research is discussed in material to follow. See Martin
K. Perry, Price Discrimination and Forward Integration, 9 BELL J. ECON. 209 (1978).
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B. Optimal Vertical Integration, Price Discrimination, and the Price
Squeeze
Under what theoretical conditions could a monopolist engage in
vertical integration and price discrimination to increase its profits (as
is usually ascribed to a price squeeze)? If it did so, would the end
result be welfare-reducing in economic terms? The analysis of econo-
mist Martin Perry provides an answer to these questions, and provides
a rigorous economic explanation to the price squeeze scenarios often
recounted at regulatory proceedings.27
Perry's analysis considers a situation in which a monopolist sells
an intermediate productive input (i.e., a wholesale service sold in an
upstream market to retailers) to two downstream (i.e., retail) markets
or market segments (both of which are competitive), and assumes free
entry prevails in both. Given this setting, Perry's model indicates that
if the input monopolist (assumed to be unregulated) integrated for-
ward into only the downstream market with the more elastic' derived
demand29 for the input, implicit price discrimination could be success-
ful. The downstream market segment with the more elastic demand
creates a corresponding derived demand for the upstream input which
is also more elastic. Economic theory and practice indicate that a
profit maximizing firm will charge a lower price for a service when the
elasticity of demand is higher (all other things being equal),. ° Simi-
larly, a profit maximizing firm selling its services in two markets or
market segments will charge different prices if the demand elasticities
are different and if arbitrage is limited." The firm will charge a higher
price in the segment with the lower demand elasticity and a lower
price in the segment with the higher elasticity.
Perry's analysis assumes that arbitrage is sufficient in the market
for the input that the firm is unable to profitably price discriminate in
27. Id. See also Martin K. Perry, Vertical Integration: Determinants and Effects, 1
HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 181, 192-96 (Richard Schmalensee & Robert
D. Willig eds., 1989).
28. Elasticity in this context is a measure of how responsive consumers are to changes
in price. The more elastic a given service, the more responsive consumers are to changes in
price. Elasticity of demand is the percentage change in quantity demanded, divided by the
percentage change in price. For example, if a service has an elasticity of 0.5, a 10% in-
crease in price will lead to a 5% drop in the quantity demanded (i.e., 10% x 0.5 = 5%).
Since elasticities are negative numbers under most conditions, they are usually quoted in
absolute value terms, e.g., a service with an elasticity of 3.0 is more elastic (i.e., price re-
sponsive) than a service with an elasticity of 1.5.
29. The demand for an input into a productive process is "derived" in part from the
demand for the downstream product that the input is used to produce.
30. JACK HIRSHLEIFER, PRICE THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 291 (1976).
31. Arbitrage is the act of buying a commodity in one market or market segment at a
low price and reselling it in another market or market segment at a higher price.
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the input market itself. Arbitrage is often more difficult in input mar-
kets than in downstream markets, in part because the aggregate effect
of even a small price differential can be significant for a downstream
firm purchasing an input. In contrast, in the final downstream market,
the product or service itself may be impossible to resell or arbitrage,
or it may represent such an insignificant proportion of the consumer's
budget that the incentive to engage in arbitrage is only slight.
Therefore, when price discrimination in the upstream market is
not possible, but is possible in the downstream market, the upstream
supplier has the incentive to vertically integrate forward into the
downstream segment with the more elastic demand. The vertically in-
tegrated firm will charge a relatively low price in the demand elastic
market segment, leaving other downstream firms to serve the less
elastic segment at the higher price. At the same time, the vertically
integrated firm will raise the price of the input for sales to the non-
integrated segment suppliers facing the less elastic downstream de-
mand (as well as the less elastic derived demand for the input).
Downstream firms will find it unprofitable to serve the more elastic
segment because there will be a small differential between the low
downstream price and the relatively high price of the upstream pro-
ductive input.
The unprofitable differential between retail and wholesale price
in the integrated, more elastic portion of the market comprises what
has been referred to as a "price squeeze." As Perry explains, "Typical
discussions of the 'squeeze' argue that it is a foreclosure technique
employed to extend monopoly power into another stage of produc-
tion."32 Thus, Perry recognizes that this narrowing of the differential
in prices between wholesale and retail markets is "merely a conse-
quence of successful price discrimination via forward integration"33 so
as to maximize profits, rather than an overt plan to engineer a narrow-
ing of this price differential to elicit exit of downstream rivals. A firm
engaging in this pricing strategy could easily enrich both customers
and itself in an economically efficient way.34
32. See Perry, supra note 26, at 210 n.2.
33. Id.
34. The economics literature indicates that there are many instances in which price
discrimination can be welfare-improving, that is, consumers are better off on average by
allowing price discrimination rather than prohibiting it. In addition, price discrimination is
very common in many kinds of markets. See, e.g., Louis PHLIPS, THE ECONOMICS OF
PRICE DISCRIMINATION 143 (1983); Louis Phlips, Price Discrimination: A Survey of the
Theory, 2 JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC SURVEYS 135, 136 (1988).
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Thus, under certain conditions, the input monopolist finds that
vertical integration into the more elastic35 market is profitable. Inte-
gration allows the monopolist implicitly to institute a lower input price
to this segment while simultaneously avoiding arbitrage in the input
market (by using the input itself to supply the downstream segment).
For the profit maximizing input monopolist selling to two or more
segments, markets or industries, the internal transfer price for use of
the input by the same firm which produces the input to serve the more
elastic downstream demand will be less than the external price for the
input sold to downstream firms. This is what gives this pricing strategy
the appearance of an overt "price squeeze" designed to elicit exit of
downstream rivals.
While this strategy is not a predatory tactic designed to foreclose
downstream competition, it is instructive to examine the economic
conditions that would make such a strategy possible. One important
condition is the lack of either competition or regulation of prices in
the market for the production of the input. If, however, there were a
competitive input supply in the upstream (wholesale) market then the
primary supplier or initial supplier is no longer a pure monopolist,
although it may become a "dominant firm."3 6 In this circumstance,
the existence of competition in the market for the supply of produc-
tive inputs would cause the price charged by the vertically integrated,
dominant firm which supplies those inputs to be lower than the price
that would be charged for the same inputs by a monopolist in the
same market. This lower upstream input price would impede the
dominant firm's ability to price discriminate via forward integration
because the high input price, and a commensurately high downstream
price, created the opportunity for downstream integration into one
segment in order to lower the downstream price in the segment. All
downstream prices are low because of competitive input supply.
If the input market were supplied only by a natural monopolist
(with no competition), but a regulatory body constrains prices or prof-
its in the input market, then the input supplier's ability to price dis-
criminate via forward integration would be similarly impeded. This is
35. The monopolist chooses the more elastic market because if, for example, it inte-
grated into the inelastic stage of production instead, "resale and free entry would prevent
price discrimination. The manufacturer could not contract input employment in the inelas-
tic stage while lowering the input price intended for the elastic stage." Perry, Vertical Inte-
gration: Determinants and Effects, supra note 27, at 193.
36. A dominant firm is a firm that has market power in a given industry, and serves as
a price leader when faced with competition from smaller rivals. The dominant firm sets
prices as a monopolist after due account is made for supply from the so-called "competitive
fringe" of small firms at each price.
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a significant result whether the dominant firm is already integrated
(but cannot price discriminate), or whether it is not integrated (but
chooses not to integrate forward at all).
This leads to an important conclusion regarding vertical integra-
tion, price squeezes, and imputation policies. Forward integration, re-
gardless of its welfare effects, is curbed by upper limits on prices of
inputs sold in the upstream market as long as these limits prevent a
firm from gaining market power in the upstream market. Imputation
policies, however, are price floors that apply to the prices of down-
stream services sold by the integrated firm. Thus, even if forward in-
tegration were somehow guaranteed to be welfare-reducing,
imputation policies would not necessarily prevent the occurrence of
this reduction. Regulations on the upper limits of upstream produc-
tive input prices, however, would serve to prevent inefficient incen-
tives for vertical foreclosure (if such incentives existed in the first
place).
C. The Ordover-Sykes-Wdlig Model of Complementary Products and the
Perfect Price Squeeze
The example above assumed that the upstream monopoly market
was unregulated, although it considered the effect of fringe competi-
tion. The economics literature contains a dearth of rigorous analyses
of the vertical merger or price squeeze strategy of a firm subject to
public utility regulation. One such analysis that can be adapted to
network industries such as telecommunications is that of Ordover,
Sykes, and Willig.37 The Ordover, Sykes, and Willig (OSW) analysis
was intended to analyze the behavior of dominant firms towards the
producers of complementary products used in conjunction with the
dominant firm's product (in the form of an integrated system).
If we assume that various network functions, such as switching
and transport, conform to the definition of a system, the OSW analysis
allows inferences about the behavior of firms that sell upstream serv-
ices (e.g., access services) as well as the downstream service that
utilizes the upstream input. For example, if long distance carriers are
viewed as using LEC access services in conjunction with their own
networks and the networks of other firms (such as competitive access
providers) as a system, the OSW model offers significant theoretical
insight into the process of a price squeeze. Basically, the OSW model
37. Janusz A. Ordover et al., Nonprice Anticompetitive Behavior by Dominant Firms
Toward the Producers of Complementary Products, ANTITRUST AND REGULATION: Es-
SAYS IN MEMORY OF JOHN J. McGOWAN 115 (Franklin M. Fisher ed., 1985). The Ordover-
Sykes-Willig model is more fully discussed in Appendix 1.
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shows what a perfect price squeeze is in the absence of regulation, and
what type of pricing behavior of the vertically integrated firm would
be observed. An illustration of a perfect price squeeze allows infer-
ences about the effectiveness of imputation policies.
The OSW analysis posits a market in which two products-com-
ponents 1 and 2-are used jointly as a system by consumers. This is
similar to a market in which, for example, customers such as long dis-
tance carriers use the network services of an LEC and a competitive
access provider's (CAP's) fiber-based network to transport telecom-
munications.38 The OSW model assumes that only one producer (the
monopolist) supplies one component, whereas an unspecified number
of alternate suppliers provide the other component. The OSW analy-
sis examines the question of what prices the monopolist will set so as
to engage in a perfect price squeeze and extract all possible monopoly
profits from the market. OSW examine three specific scenarios: (1)
the monopolist sells only the monopoly component, but nothing else,
(2) the monopolist sells only the system itself (both components bun-
dled together as a system), but no other service arrangement, and (3)
the monopolist unbundles and sells both components to all customers
wishing to purchase them (even its own competitors). This last scena-
rio is the most relevant to telecommunications markets such as in-
traLATA toll (the downstream service) and LEC access services (the
upstream service), though all three scenarios yield equivalent conclu-
sions about pricing and profits.
Perhaps the most important contribution of the OSW model, in
the context of imputation policies, is that it unveils what a perfect
price squeeze is, showing what conditions would have to exist to allow
one to occur, and hence allows inferences as to how regulation or
other factors would prevent one from occurring. OSW conclude that:
[I]f the dominant firm can execute a perfect price squeeze and
thereby earn all of the monopoly profit available in the systems
market, it has no incentive to engage in anticompetitive behavior.
Moreover, all systems sold in the market will incorporate compo-
nents from the most efficient producers regardless of which firms
produce the components complementary to those of the dominant
firm.39
38. A competitive access provider (CAP) is basically a seller of network transmission
services to large business users. CAPs compete with LECs in offering dedicated connec-
tions between telecommunications users' locations (primarily large corporate offices in the
densely populated business districts of major cities) and IXCs' long distance networks.
Two of the major CAPs are Metropolitan Fiber Systems, Inc. and Teleport Communica-
tions Group.
39. Ordover, supra note 37, at 117.
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The model also demonstrates that the dominant firm makes the same
profits regardless of its bundling strategy.40
The OSW model provides two insights for imputation policy anal-
ysis. First, a price squeeze in even the most perfect case need not
involve refusals to deal (which in economic terms is the same as set-
ting an arbitrarily high or infinite price for the upstream productive
input), or foreclosure of competition in complementary markets. The
vertically integrated firm need not elicit the exit of downstream com-
petitors to increase its profits. Second, the OSW analysis indicates
that market power in one component market cannot be extended au-
tomatically to another complementary market if other producers are
more efficient than the dominant firm.
While these are important and valuable insights into price
squeeze strategies, perhaps the most important conclusion in the
OSW analysis is that a curb on the upper limits of prices for the domi-
nant firm's monopoly market will prevent a price squeeze. The OSW
analysis does not explicitly consider this curb in the form of public
utility regulation; however, it analyzes a scenario in which competition
in the (former) monopoly market is present, making it impossible for
the dominant firm to charge the monopoly price. The analysis indi-
cates that such a curb would "constrain the price a dominant firm can
charge for its products to the point where a perfect price squeeze be-
comes infeasible."'" In other words, it is not a price floor on the
downstream service that prevents a price squeeze; rather, it is the
existence of a constraint on how high the upstream service price may
be set. Such a constraint is embodied in public utility regulation. The
OSW model indicates that when regulation sets the price of the up-
stream productive input, an imputation policy (which is equivalent to
a price floor on the downstream service) is duplicative and unneeded.
The price ceiling on the upstream service is sufficient to prevent a
price squeeze.
D. Even Economically Efficient Pricing Under Regulation Can Appear
to Be a "Price Squeeze"
The OSW model shows the value of an upper limit on the pricing
of upstream services in preventing a perfect price squeeze. Yet in
daily regulatory practice, the value of a regulatory constraint (e.g.,
price caps or rate of return regulation) seems to go largely unrecog-
nized in state regulatory efforts involving imputation policies. If pric-
ing practices such as price squeezes are a concern, the traditional
40. Id.
41. Id. at 118.
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upper limit on the pricing of the intermediate productive input sold in
the upstream market comprises a powerful public policy instrument; it
does not need to be augmented with a price floor in the downstream
market in the form of an imputation policy.
Further, the existence of a regulatory constraint (i.e., a regulatory
agency imposed ceiling on upstream prices) suggests that a previously
proposed theoretical rule for detecting a price squeeze-that the ratio
of price-to-marginal-cost be equated across both upstream (whole-
sale) and downstream (retail) services offered by a vertically inte-
grated firm-is seriously flawed.42 A recognition of the value of a
regulatory constraint on the prices of upstream services (in the ab-
sence of competition) yields an important conclusion-that a pro-
posed test for determining the existence of a price squeeze, the price-
to-marginal-cost ratio test, is fundamentally flawed. Under this test,
even producers operating in regulated markets at economically effi-
cient prices would exhibit the characteristics of a price squeeze
although no price squeeze actually exists. This important conclusion
is discussed in more detail later.
There are three scenarios of interest in examining both the value
of a regulatory constraint and the effect of such a constraint on the
ratio of price-to-marginal-cost for the services offered by a vertically
integrated, regulated firm. These scenarios are: (1) the regulated firm
faces a profit constraint (as in rate of return regulation), (2) the regu-
lated firm faces an aggregate, average price cap for its services, and
(3) the regulated firm faces separate price caps for each service it of-
fers.43 Under none of these regulatory scenarios would one expect to
observe an equal ratio of price-to-marginal-cost across all services.
Thus, under extremely plausible assumptions about regulation, such
ratios cannot be used reliably to indicate whether a price squeeze is
taking place.
To discuss the first scenario, that of rate-of-return regulation, con-
sider an extreme theoretical example involving a natural monopolist
42. John E. Lopatka, The Electric Utility Price Squeeze as an Antitrust Cause of Action,
31 UCLA L. REv. 563, 588 (1984). Lopatka defines a price squeeze (in the context of the
electric utility industry) as the condition such that the ratio of the private utility's wholesale
price to its marginal cost of wholesale service exceeds the ratio of the private utility's retail
price to its marginal cost of retail service. Id. at 588. He acknowledges, however, that such
a test may be of limited practical value due to the difficulty of computing marginal cost. Id.
at 590.
43. The first scenario corresponds to the traditional form of regulation in telecommu-
nications, that is, rate base, rate of return regulation. The second corresponds to the cur-
rent federal regulation of interstate services such as AT&T's interstate long distance and
the interstate access services of the LECs. The third scenario corresponds to some state
incentive regulation plans, such as the one currently employed in Kansas.
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that is charging Ramsey prices for its services. By definition, Ramsey
prices are those prices that maximize total economic welfare (i.e., eco-
nomic efficiency or the sum of consumer surplus and regulated firm
profits) subject to a profit constraint on the regulated firm. Thus,
Ramsey prices are theoretically the most efficient uniform prices for
public utility pricing." Ramsey prices are optimal departures from
marginal cost pricing when marginal cost pricing would yield deficits
for the regulated firm.45
Using simple algebraic manipulation, it is easy to show that even
an efficient, Ramsey pricing natural monopolist46 will not set prices
that yield price-to-marginal-cost ratios that are equated across all of a
regulated firm's services. This can occur only if the own-price elastici-
ties of all services are equal, a very unlikely occurrence.4 7 Since a nat-
ural monopolist charging economically efficient Ramsey prices will
not have equal ratios of price-to-marginal-cost for all services, an ex-
amination of this ratio is useless as a means of detecting a price
squeeze.
The same conclusion is drawn regarding the second scenario, one
in which the regulated firm is subject to an aggregate, average price
cap. The Monson and Larson model of the price cap regulated firm
44. Uniform prices consist of a simple unit price per unit of output sold. Other
nonuniform pricing methods may be more efficient than Ramsey prices, such as optimal
two-part or multi-part tariffs. The efficient maxim of Ramsey prices is used here only as a
polar extreme to illustrate the point. Even a Ramsey-pricing natural monopolist will not
equate price-to-marginal-cost ratios across services. A good general discussion of Ramsey
pricing may be found in EDWARD E. ZAJAC, FAIRNESS OR EFFICIENCY: AN INTRODUC-
TION TO PUBLIC UTILITY PRICING 21-32 (1978). Several texts cover the mathematical deri-
vation of Ramsey prices. See, e.g., BRIDGER M. MITCHELL & INGO VOGELSANG,
TELECOMMUNICATIONS PRICING: THEORY AND PRACTICE 43-48 (1991); STEPHEN J.
BROWN & DAVID S. SIBLEY, THE THEORY OF PUBLIC UTILITY PRICING 39-44 (1986); Wil-
liam A. Brock, Pricing, Predation, and Entry Barriers in Regulated Industries, BREAKING
Up BELL: ESSAYS ON INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION AND REGULATION 191,192-94 (David
S. Evans ed., 1983).
45. If the regulated firm has scale economies, then setting prices at marginal cost will
not recover total costs, and will result in deficits. In such a case, Ramsey prices are optimal
departures from marginal cost pricing.
46. Ramsey prices result from maximizing economic welfare (i.e., both consumer and
producer surplus) for a regulated firm subject to a profit constraint such as standard rate of
return regulation. A Ramsey pricing natural monopolist comprises the most economically
efficient source of industry supply; hence, if such a firm fails the equal price-to-marginal-
cost ratio test across services, such a test is seriously flawed as a detection method for a
price squeeze.
47. This assumes independent demands for all services. What this indicates is that one
would not observe the price-to-marginal-cost ratio being equated across services even for
the most economically efficient uniform prices that a monopolist subject to a profit con-
straint could charge. Ramsey prices, however, are the most efficient (if marginal cost pric-
ing is not feasible), a theoretical maxim that is not practiced in real industrial markets
either by regulators or regulated firms.
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indicates that for the firm subject to an average, aggregate price cap
"basket" for a grouping of services, simple algebraic manipulation
also shows the price-to-marginal-cost ratio for all services in the bas-
ket can only be equated across services under very implausible as-
sumptions.48 Again, an examination of this ratio is useless as a means
of detecting a price squeeze.49
Regarding the third scenario, in which there are separate price
caps for each service, this same conclusion must be drawn. The math-
ematical conditions required to analyze this scenario were derived by
Larson and Parsons.5" This analysis indicates that in maximizing prof-
its subject to regulatory constraints on services, the ratios of price-to-
marginal-cost would not be equated across all services. The Larson
and Parsons model also indicates that regardless of whether the regu-
latory constraints actually constrain the regulated firm's pricing be-
havior, one would not observe prices for the upstream productive
input that are equated with the marginal cost of the input to the regu-
lated firm.5 Thus, the same conclusion must be drawn as in the other
two scenarios.
48. The necessary analysis was performed by starting with the pricing relationships of
services of firms subject to price cap regulation as developed in Calvin S. Monson & Alex-
ander C. Larson, Pricing and Investment Incentives Under Price Ceiling Regulation, PRICE
CAPS AND INCENTIVE REGULATION IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS 221 (Michael A. Einhom
ed., 1991). Starting with the pricing relationship between services, it is easy to show that
the price-to-marginal-cost ratio only can be equated between services under economic con-
ditions existing only under coincidence. Id. at 225. One of these coincidences is that the
output levels of all services be equal, a wholly unrealistic assumption. Thus, under very
plausible assumptions regarding a price cap regulatory regime, one should expect an ine-
quality of price-to-marginal-cost ratios between services, the very condition with which
some authors have sought to define a price squeeze. See, e.g., Lopatka, supra note 42.
49. Research by Monson and Larson indicates that for a firm subject to an average,
aggregate price cap, weighted marginal profits across services would be equated if the firm
was allowed to set its own prices. Monson & Larson, supra note 48, at 225. This condition,
however, does not lead to the conclusion that the ratios of prices-to-marginal-costs will be
equated across the services comprising a price cap basket. Examining weighted marginal
profits across services in a price cap basket may be a better test than Lopatka's test; how-
ever, in the presence of regulatory agencies setting prices for regulated LECs in sometimes
an arbitrary fashion, even this test may be of limited use.
50. Alexander C. Larson & Steve G. Parsons, An Economic Analysis of Transfer Pric-
ing and Imputation Policies for Public Utilities, INCENTIVE REGULATION FOR PUBLIC UTIL-
ITIES (M. A. Crew ed., forthcoming). Larson and Parsons assume a vertically integrated
regulated firm which produces two services, upstream productive inputs used internally
and by downstream competitors and the downstream final service. Each service is price
cap-regulated, and the regulated firm is expected to maximize total economic welfare sub-
ject to the price cap constraints and various other constraints.
51. Id. The conclusion that a vertically integrated firm would set an access price that
exceeds the marginal cost of providing access is also contained in JEAN-JACQUES LAFFONT




In summary, these results indicate that in terms of price squeeze
strategies an inequality of price-to-marginal-cost ratios for the services
offered by a regulated firm does not indicate the presence of a price
squeeze. This is true even if the ratio for wholesale services is higher
than that for retail services, as has been suggested in the academic
legal literature. 2 Even under economically efficient Ramsey prices,
an inequality of these ratios must result. Thus, inequalities across
price-to-marginal-cost ratios would most likely be observed even for
efficient Ramsey prices that are not a part of a price squeeze strategy,
as well as under the other two scenarios discussed.53 For example,
under both types of price cap regulatory regimes, this same set of con-
ditions should be expected-ratios of price-to-marginal-cost will not
be equated for all services.* Again, one must conclude that an inequal-
ity of price-to-marginal-cost ratios for the services offered by a regu-
lated firm does not necessarily indicate the existence of a price
squeeze. It is the type of pricing that could reasonably be expected,
even if a regulated firm were required to set efficient Ramsey prices in
conjunction with its regulatory constraint.
II
Applied Economic Analysis in Antitrust Court:
Town of Concord v. Boston Edison Co. 54
A. Introduction
The topic of price squeezes is certainly not confined to public util-
ity regulation. It has been the subject of several antitrust suits in re-
cent years. In fact, the very concept of a price squeeze originates in
antitrust. The prospect of a "price squeeze" as a monopolizing device
was introduced into antitrust law by Judge Learned Hand in the Alcoa
case, perhaps the best-known antitrust decision by a court of ap-
peals.56 Under the Alcoa standard (the underlying logic of which
52. See Lopatka, supra note 42.
53. The result developed here assumes that demands between services are independ-
ent. When demands are interdependent (i.e., cross-elasticities between services are non-
zero), Ramsey prices are not always subsidy-free. The fact that Ramsey prices will not
always be subsidy-free was first pointed out in Edward E. Zajac, Some Preliminary
Thoughts on Subsidization, PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS, CONFERENCE ON COMMUNICA-
TION POLICY RESEARCH (Office of Telecommunications Policy ed., 1972).
54. 915 F.2d 17 (1st Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 931 (1991).
55. A compilation of these cases can be found in Keith A. Rowley, Note, Immunity
from Regulatory Price Squeeze Claims: From Keogh, Parker, and Noerr to Town of Con-
cord and Beyond, 70 TEX. L. REV. 399, 411 n. 67 (1991).
56. Judge Hand wrote that a price squeeze violates § 2 of the Sherman Act when (1)
the firm conducting the price squeeze has either monopoly power at the first industry level
or in the upstream market for productive inputs, (2) the firm's price at this level is "higher
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seems to persist in state public utility regulation), a price squeeze oc-
curs when the monopoly input supplier charges a price for the input to
its downstream competitors57 that is so high that they cannot profita-
bly sell the downstream product in competition with the integrated
firm. The vertically integrated firm implicitly charges itself much less
for the input than it charges its own competitors. The integrated firm
could drive its competitors out of the market by engaging in the price
squeeze and "extend" its monopoly from the wholesale market to the
retail market.5
Scholars and the courts have made significant academic advances
in the law and economics of vertical integration, antitrust, and regula-
tion since Alcoa, and the Alcoa case has been the subject of many
studies, debates, and legal citations.5 9 Recent antitrust cases involving
electric power companies have employed sophisticated economic rea-
soning that offers some valuable lessons for telecommunications regu-
lation, and in particular for those who would impose imputation
policies.60 In Town of Concord v. Boston Edison Co., the court used
sound economic analysis to make inferences about the legality of reg-
ulated firm behavior in an alleged price squeeze scenario. 61 This case
has particular relevance to a discussion of imputation policies as a
means of guarding against anticompetitive price squeezes.
than a 'fair price,"' and (3) its price in the downstream market is so low that its competi-
tors cannot match the price and still make a "living profit." United States v. Aluminum
Co. of Am. (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416, 436-38 (2d Cir. 1945). See also Bonjorno v. Kaiser
Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 752 F.2d 802, 808-11 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 908
(1986); George C. Frey Ready-Mixed Concrete, Inc. v. Pine Hill Concrete Mix Corp., 554
F.2d 551, 553 (2d Cir. 1977); Carl Hizel & Sons, Inc. v. Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc., 600 F.
Supp. 161, 161-62 (D. Colo. 1985).
57. That is, those who purchase productive inputs in the wholesale market from the
same firm with which they compete in the retail market.
58. Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 438.
59. See, e.g., 3 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW I 729c, at
235-38 (1978) (arguing that Alcoa overstated the harms, understated the benefits, and dis-
regarded significant administrative burdens associated with a price squeeze). See also
Robin C. Landis & Ronald S. Rolfe, Market Conduct Under Section 2: When Is It An-
ticompetitive?, ANTITRUST AND REGULATION: ESSAYS IN MEMORY OF JOHN J. McGOWAN
131, 151 n.51 (Franklin M. Fisher ed., 1985) ("Alcoa has been cited in more than 40 U.S.
Supreme Court opinions, almost 200 opinions by federal courts of appeals, and over 250
federal district courts, as well as in numerous law review articles.").
60. "Antitrust claims against regulated utilities based on price squeeze theories are
typically brought by municipal electric systems against integrated investor-owned utilities."
Page I. Austin, Town of Concord v. Boston Edison: A Per Se Rule of Legality for Price
Squeezes in Regulated Industries, 5 ANTITRUST 40, 40 (1991). Nearly half the antitrust
cases brought against electric utilities are premised on a price squeeze. Douglas G. Green,
Changing Industry Structure and Dynamics: A New Generation of Electric Utility Cases
Emerges, 7 ANTITRUST 28 (1992).
61. 915 F.2d 17 (1st Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 931 (1991).
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B. Town of Concord v. Boston Edison Co. 62
Like the economic analyses of Joskow and Ordover, Sykes, and
Willig, the Concord court recognized that a regulatory constraint can
prevent anticompetitive pricing practices such as a price squeeze.63
The Concord court concluded that price regulation will, in most cases,
prevent a price squeeze from constituting an exclusionary practice
proscribed by § 2 of the Sherman Act.' 4 Further, the court implicitly
recognized the importance of economic efficiency by distinguishing
between harm to a firm's competitors and harm to the competitive
process itself:
[A] practice is not "anticompetitive" simply because it harms com-
petitors. After all, almost all business activity, desirable and unde-
sirable alike, seeks to advance a firm's fortunes at the expense of its
competitors. Rather, a practice is "anticompetitive" only if it harms
the competitive process. It harms that process when it obstructs the
achievement of competition's basic goals-lower prices, better
products, and more efficient production. 65
From an economics perspective, the importance of this point cannot
be overstated in a discussion of regulatory policy, since a vertically
integrated firm may have economies (due to the scale and scope of
operations) that would be foregone if imputation policies are
employed.
The Concord court concluded that "in light of regulatory rules,
constraints, and practices, the price squeeze at issue here is not ordi-
narily exclusionary, and, for that reason, it does not violate the Sher-
man Act."'6 6 To arrive at this conclusion, the court first analyzed the
"ordinary" price squeeze that an unregulated firm supposedly could
employ, and compared it to the price squeeze strategy of a firm sub-
ject to regulation of the prices it can charge in the upstream market
for productive inputs. The court noted that "regulation makes a criti-
cal difference in terms of antitrust harms, benefits, and administrative
considerations."67 It chose not to apply the Alcoa price squeeze rules
"in the presence of significantly different economic circumstances
such as full economic regulation."6 This is significant because impu-
tation rules in regulation, when applied, are but a mirroring of the
"transfer price test" employed by Judge Hand in the Alcoa case,
which completely ignores any regulatory constraint and is essentially
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 22. See also Austin, supra note 60, at 41.
65. Town of Concord, 915 F.2d at 21-22.
66. Id. at 22.
67. Id. at 23.
68. Id. at 25.
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blind to economic efficiency considerations.69 In applying a more ad-
vanced economic approach, the Concord court implicitly acknowl-
edged the economic naivet6 of the outdated price squeeze analysis
employed in Alcoa, recognizing that inefficient firms may justifiably
fail to make a "living profit" when competing against an efficient ver-
tically integrated firm, and that "[f]ull price regulation dramatically
alters the calculus of antitrust harms and benefits. 70
Perhaps most importantly, the Concord court recognized that a
regulatory constraint can prevent antitrust harm, arguing that it "di-
minishes the likelihood of 'entry barrier' harm, namely the risk that
(1) prices will rise because (2) new firms will hesitate to enter a mar-
ket and compete after (3) a squeeze has driven existing independent
competitors from the marketplace."'71 The court also recognized that
in regulated industries, regulators usually control prices directly, and
that by statute these prices are typically required to be set at just and
reasonable "levels."'72 Further, it recognized that factors related to
regulation itself (such as the legal requirement that a firm secure per-
mission to enter) are more likely to determine new entry into a regu-
lated market than the entrant's fear of the incumbent firm's
retaliatory power, since regulatory agencies can prevent refusals to
deal or the charging of unreasonably high prices for productive
inputs.73
The Concord court also made an economic efficiency argument,
concluding that to the extent regulated prices reflect costs, an inte-
grated utility's prices are likely to squeeze independent distributors
who buy from it at wholesale only if those distributors operate less
efficiently (i.e., at higher cost). 74 The court concluded that a rule
69. The transfer price test is equivalent to an imputation policy because it requires
courts to examine whether the vertically integrated firm could have sold its downstream
output profitably at prevailing prices, assuming it had to pay the same price for the up-
stream productive input internally produced as it charged to its downstream competitors.
See Joskow, supra note 22, at 186-87; Rowley, supra note 55, at 407. Judge Hand's price
squeeze was defined to exist if the integrated supplier could not sell its downstream prod-
ucts profitably, assuming it had to pay a transfer price equal to what it charged downstream
competitors for the upstream productive input. Joskow, supra note 22, at 187. Thus, Judge
Hand's "transfer price test" employs the same economic reasoning as a regulatory imputa-
tion policy applied to a vertically integrated regulated firm, and like an imputation policy,
it can easily ignore economic efficiency (i.e., it can ignore the fact that a vertically inte-
grated firm may have greater productive efficiency than its downstream rivals) and that the
advantage gained by the more efficient vertically integrated firm may in no way foreclose
competition on the merits in the downstream market, or harm economic welfare.
70. Town of Concord, 915 F.2d at 25.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 26.
74. Id.
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preventing prices that create a squeeze would more likely discourage
efficient operations and deprive consumers of lower prices that would
improve their economic welfare.75 It also rejected the plaintiff's advo-
cated anti-price squeeze rule, one which required "equal profit earned
at both levels" of the market (retail and wholesale), arguing that such
a method would at best be the product of an arbitrary allocation of
costs between the retail and wholesale sides of the market.76
iI
Towards Economically Sound Price Floors
The heart of an economically sound imputation policy, if such
policies are considered necessary, is the use of an appropriate cost-
based price floor rooted in the concept of opportunity cost. Opportu-
nity cost is a measure of the best return that a resource could obtain in
an alternative use. 77 This section explains this simple paradigm and
addresses several questions germane to the design of imputation poli-
cies, such as: What amount should be "imputed" to the price floor of
a downstream service? Why, and under what economic conditions?
A. Cost-Based Price Floors
The economics literature on costs provides a framework for de-
signing and evaluating imputation mechanisms. A cost standard can
be used to establish the proper lower bound limitations on pricing; the
key is identifying the proper cost method and the calculation that
matches the public policy or business decision in question. For a mul-
tiproduct firm, the lower bound for pricing a service should always be
incremental cost, that is, those costs that could be avoided if addi-
tional units of that service were no longer offered. 78 The closely re-
lated concept of marginal cost is the standard for economic efficiency
in production and exchange. In the predatory pricing literature, mar-




77. ROBERT A. MEYER, MICROECONOMIC DECISIONS 119 (1976).
78. Generally, "marginal cost" is used as a technical term to refer to the first deriva-
tive of the total cost function with respect to the quantity of a specific product or service.
"Incremental cost" is often used to refer to discrete changes in cost due to discrete changes
in quantity, or the cost associated with a service in total. Conceptually, the terms are very
similar in that they are based on cost causation.
79. Several detection methods for predatory pricing, based in whole or in part on a
comparison of the price-cost relationship, have appeared in the literature since 1975, the
year the well-known Areeda-Turner test was developed. See Phillip Areeda & Donald
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In the regulatory economics literature on cross-subsidy, incre-
mental cost is the lower bound for subsidy-free pricing of any service
or group of services.8' The gross incremental cost test requires that
revenue generated from that service be no lower than the incremental
cost of providing the service. In instances in which the revenues and
the costs of the service are independent of any other product's reve-
nues and costs, this test is clearly sufficient to prevent services from
Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88
HARV. L. REV. 697, 732-33 (1975) (arguing that prices above reasonably anticipated short
run marginal costs (SRMC) should be presumed lawful; that prices below SRMC should be
presumed unlawful; and that average variable cost can be used as a workable proxy for
SRMC). In their 1978 treatise, Areeda and Turner modified their 1975 standard by casting
the presumption of legality for pricing at or above marginal cost as refutable rather than
conclusive. See 3 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 711d
(1978).
Other tests appearing in the literature are based on the concept of incremental cost.
See, e.g., WILLIAM J. BAUMOL, SUPERFAIRNESS: APPLICATIONS AND THEORY 118-20
(1986) [hereinafter BAUMOL, SUPERFAIRNESS] (arguing that gross incremental revenues
must equal or exceed gross incremental costs); RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW:
AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE (1976) (promoting the Areeda-Turner test, but using long-run
marginal cost in lieu of SRMC); William J. Baumol, Quasi-Permanence of Price Reduc-
tions: A Policy for Prevention of Predatory Pricing, 89 YALE L.J. 1, 4-6, 9-10 (1979) (argu-
ing that the dominant firm should be prohibited from cutting its price in response to entry
and then reversing the price cut once the entrant has exited the market; price cannot fall
below a cost-based standard such as the Areeda-Turner test); Paul L. Joskow & Alvin K.
Klevorick, A Framework for Analyzing Predatory Pricing Policy, 89 YALE L.J. 213, 242-62
(1979) (offering a two-tiered test: (1) a structural analysis to determine whether the mar-
ket structure is such that a dominant firm would engage in predatory pricing activity, and
(2) if the structural characteristics suggest that the efficiency losses are likely to be high, a
comparison between revenues and average total cost); Oliver E. Williamson, Predatory
Pricing: A Strategic and Welfare Analysis, 87 YALE L.J. 284, 336-37 (1977) (using both
short-run average cost and long-run average cost as floors for predatory prices against
established rivals); Richard 0. Zerbe, Jr. & Donald S. Cooper, An Empirical and Theoreti-
cal Comparison of Alternative Predation Rules, 61 TEx. L. REv. 655, 686 (1982) (offering a
modified Areeda-Turner rule in which any price below average total costs is predatory
when production at that price is on the upward slope of the average total cost curve, and
any price below average variable cost is predatory). See also Janusz A. Ordover & Garth
Saloner, Predation, Monopolization, and Antitrust, 1 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANI-
ZATION 537 (Richard Schmalensee & Robert D. Willig eds., 1989); DANIEL F. SPULBER,
REGULATION AND MARKETS 479-81 (1989). For a discussion of the cost-based standards
that the circuit courts have employed, see Richard B. Rogers, Predatory Pricing: A Practi-
cal Perspective, 5 ANTITRUST 9 (1990).
80. Gerald R. Faulhaber, Cross-Subsidization: Pricing in Public Enterprises, 65 AM.
ECON. REV. 966 (1975); Gerald R. Faulhaber & Stephen B. Levinson, Subsidy-Free Prices
and Anonymous Equity, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 1083 (1981); William J. Baumol, Minimum
and Maximum Pricing Principles for Residual Regulation, 5 E. ECON. J. 235, 241-44 (1979),
reprinted in COST AND PRICING PRINCIPLES FOR TELECOMMUNICATIONS: AN ANTHOL-
OGY 5 (Alexander C. Larson & Mark E. Meitzen eds., 1990) [hereinafter Baumol, Mini-
mum and Maximum Pricing]; BAUMOL, SUPERFAIRNESS, supra note 79, at 113-20;
MITCHELL & VOGELSANG, supra note 44, 118-25; SPULBER, supra note 79, at 120-27; JEAN-
JACQUES LAFFONT & JEAN TIROLE, A THEORY OF INCENTIVES IN PROCUREMENT AND
REGULATION 202-03 (1993); ZAJAC, supra note 44, at 88-89.
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receiving a subsidy and creates what are known in economics as anon-
ymously equitable (i.e., fair) price relationships between groups of
customers purchasing the services."
However, if the multiple services provided by a firm have interre-
lated demands (e.g., where services are substitutes for each other), the
issue of cross-subsidy becomes somewhat more complex.82 The net
incremental cost test for cross-subsidy accounts for these cross-elastic
effects;83 it will find an operation free from cross-subsidy where the
increment in total revenue to the firm due to selling a service (includ-
ing cross-elastic effects) is no less than the increment in the firm's to-
tal costs (either directly or indirectly) due to the provision of the
service, that is, incremental costs do not exceed incremental revenues,
with full account taken of cross-elastic effects.
As an example, consider the following illustration. Firm A offers
services 1 and 2, which are substitutes for each other. It then chooses
to raise drastically the price of service 1. To perform a net incremen-
tal cost test of this decision, firm A should compare the total revenues
due to: (1) increased revenues from selling service 1 at a higher price,
and (2) a migration of sales from the higher priced service 1 to its
substitute, service 2. In this migration, sales volumes of service 1 fall,
but sales volumes of service 2 increase. The total change in revenues
is the total change in revenues from both service 1, and its substitute,
service 2. The corresponding incremental changes in costs would also
81. See BAUMOL, SUPERFAIRNESS, supra note 79, at 121; MITCHELL & VOGELSANG,
supra note 44, at 121. See also Karen Palmer, A New Test for Cross-Subsidies in Regulated
Industries with Applications to a Local Telecommunications Monopoly (1989) (Ph.D. Dis-
sertation, Boston College).
82. See BAUMOL, SUPERFAIRNESS, supra note 79, at 121; MITCHELL & VOGELSANG,
supra note 44 at 121. See also Palmer, supra note 81, at 7 n.1 (standard treatment of cross-
subsidies assumes zero cross-elasticities of demand; incremental revenues not reflected ac-
curately with non-zero cross-elasticities).
83. The FCC has also advocated a net incremental cost test called the "net revenue
test" in orders involving telecommunications. Guidelines for Dominant Carriers' MTS
Rates and Rate Restructure Plans, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 50 Fed. Reg. 42,946
(1985). See also BAUMOL, SUPERFAIRNESS, supra note 79, at 117-18. A cross-elasticity is a
measure of the responsiveness of the demand for a given service with respect to changes in
the price of another, related service. It is the percentage change in demand of a service
divided by the percentage change in the price of another service with which it has interre-
lated demands. A simple example may serve to explain this concept. Assume that two
services, A and B, are substitutes for each other. A multiproduct firm sells both of them.
If it lowers the price of one of these services (e.g., B), customers will shift their preferences
from A to B. Thus, in measuring the expected profits from lowering the price of B, the
multiproduct firm must count the increased profits from B, not only the profits lost due to
selling less of A. This is an example of a cross-elastic effect. Thus, if the cross-elasticity of
service A with respect to the price of service B is 0.5, then a 10% decrease in the price of B
will result in a 5% decrease in the sales volume of A.
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be computed, and then subtracted from the incremental revenues for
a net figure. The net incremental cost test, in this example, deter-
mines the net profits firm A would expect to gain from increasing the
price of service 1. It would also indicate whether cross-subsidies were
required by this price change.
A net incremental cost test is also known as the "burden test" or
the "net revenue test." By any name it has important implications for
imputation policy, since it is based on total opportunity costs, which
define the proper amount of imputation. 4
All of this leads to an important premise for the proper evalua-
tion of imputation policies. The contribution (revenues minus incre-
mental costs) that would be earned by the LEC in providing access
services to IXCs is foregone in providing a downstream service such as
intraLATA long distance, and could be considered a "cost" (or more
precisely, an opportunity foregone) of providing intraLATA long dis-
tance. Using this premise, subsequent sections of this Article argue
that as the underlying basis of a generic imputation policy, the proper
economic price floor is composed of two key elements: the explicit
incremental costs of providing the downstream service (intraLATA
long distance), and the implicit opportunity cost of selling the up-
stream productive input, or equivalently, the contribution foregone
from not selling the upstream productive input (access services)., 5 In
essence, the LEC imputes the foregone contribution from access serv-
ices when such contribution is displaced by selling intraLATA long
distance.
B. Opportunity Costs Determine the Maximum Amount of Imputation
As defined in the previous section, opportunity cost is a measure
of the best return that a resource could produce in an alternative
use.86 The computation of the opportunity cost of supplying interme-
diate productive inputs such as access services requires the vertically
integrated firm to ask itself the following question: If an intermediate
productive input is to be used internally for the production of down-
stream (retail) services, what is the value of the opportunities given up
in the process; that is, what is the full opportunity cost (in terms of
both production costs and foregone sales in the upstream, or whole-
sale market) of using intermediate productive inputs internally rather
than simply selling them in the upstream market? Thus, for the verti-
cally integrated firm, the full opportunity cost of selling a downstream
84. ZAJAC, supra note 44, at 91-93.
85. See infra note 100.
86. MEYER, supra note 77.
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service (e.g., long distance) includes not only the explicit incremental
costs of producing long distance, but also any implicit opportunity
costs incurred because of the loss of the sale of an intermediate pro-
ductive input (e.g., access service). This depends on the opportunities
the vertically integrated firm has to sell the intermediate productive
input externally in lieu of simply using it internally to produce (and
sell) downstream services. These opportunities depend on the nature
of the market for the intermediate productive input, including the ef-
fect of public utility regulation.
This approach suggests that any contribution that could have
been earned by the LEC in providing access services to IXCs (and is
foregone by providing a downstream service instead, such as in-
traLATA long distance) should be included in the full opportunity
cost-based determination of the lower bound for pricing intraLATA,
long distance.
Consider three scenarios. In scenario one, assume there is no
outside market for the input. In this case the full opportunity cost to
the vertically integrated firm for the intermediate input is equal to the
straightforward marginal cost of producing the input. In the absence
of an external market for the intermediate input, the vertically inte-
grated firm has no opportunity to sell this input elsewhere, and thus
does not forego any revenue by using the intermediate input to pro-
duce the downstream service. Therefore there is no additional oppor-
tunity cost component in the calculation of the cost of providing the
downstream service.
In scenario two, assume there is an external market for the inter-
mediate productive input, and each downstream firm must purchase
the input to produce the downstream service. A very different lower
bound for pricing downstream occurs. In this case, the full cost of
providing the downstream service must include the implicit opportu-
nity cost of not selling the intermediate input to another supplier of
downstream services. The result can be stated in two equivalent ways.
First, the lower bound for pricing the downstream service by the inte-
grated firm is the straightforward marginal cost of producing the
downstream service (e.g., the marginal production cost of access plus
any additional marginal cost of toll), plus the opportunity cost, or con-
tribution foregone by directly selling the downstream service (in lieu
of the intermediate input). Second (and equivalently), the lower
bound for the price of the integrated firm's downstream service is the
marginal revenue 7 of the input plus any additional marginal costs
87. Marginal revenue is the change in total revenue due to the sale of an additional
unit. If a firm faces a downward sloping demand curve, to sell an additional unit it must
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(e.g., any nonaccess costs)."s If the input price is fixed by regulatory
fiat, this rule collapses to the price of the input plus any additional
marginal costs.89
In scenario three, assume that downstream firms need not
purchase the productive input. Here the rule is a combination of
those described in scenarios one and two. For a particular unit of
downstream service sold in which avoidance of the sale (e.g., by charg-
ing a higher downstream price) would have lead to the sale of the
upstream service, the result is exactly the same as that described in
scenario two (for that unit). However, if the avoidance of the down-
stream sale leads to another downstream firm providing the service
without that downstream firm purchasing the use of the integrated
firm's intermediate input, then there is no additional opportunity cost
due to the downstream sale, and the lower bound for pricing that unit
is simply the marginal cost of production (as in scenario one). In such
an instance, it is likely to be impossible to produce a general opportu-
nity cost-based rule.
In each of these three scenarios, the price of the downstream ser-
vice must be no less than the full opportunity cost of providing that
service. The full opportunity cost, however, will vary depending on
the nature of the market for the upstream productive input, including
the effects of public utility regulation on upstream market prices.
More importantly, in scenarios one and three, the integrated firm does
not provide a bottleneck input or essential facility. In such instances,
the very notion of forced imputation is redundant to the competitive
process itself.
C. Some Simple Numerical Examples
In general, standard managerial economics indicates that when
two services sold by the same firm are substitutes, that firm should not
sell a service that causes the firm to forego more contribution (i.e.,
revenues less incremental costs) than is gained. In other words, cross-
elastic effects (the revenues lost when customers switch from purchas-
ing one product offered by a multiproduct firm to its substitute) must
be taken into account, if it is possible to reliably estimate these effects.
lower its price slightly, gaining revenue from selling the additional unit but losing a small
amount of revenue on all other units. With a downward sloping demand curve, marginal
revenue is less than price.
88. To be more precise, the amount of cost added should be the difference between
the cost of providing the intermediate service externally and the cost of providing the input
internally as well as any additional downstream functions that are necessary.
89. Marginal revenue is below price when the price must be lowered to sell additional
quantities. However, when price is fixed or constant, marginal revenue is equal to price.
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For example, if for each minute of LEC intraLATA long distance sold,
the LEC foregoes the opportunity to sell switched access to an IXC
that would have carried the call, that LEC should not sell long dis-
tance below a level that recognizes this lost contribution.
This section demonstrates how opportunity cost should dictate
the maximum amount of imputation for regulatory purposes under a
variety of assumptions. It uses the case of intraLATA long distance
and access service as an illustrative example, and employs four differ-
ent illustrative scenarios to demonstrate how the principle of opportu-
nity cost should be used to set maximum amounts for imputation
policies.
The key thread connecting each of these illustrative scenarios is
that the contribution that would be earned by the LEC in providing
access services to IXCs is foregone in providing a downstream service
such as intraLATA long distance, and therefore should be considered
a "cost" (or more correctly, an opportunity cost, or opportunity fore-
gone) of providing intraLATA long distance. The value of the oppor-
tunity foregone is determined by the regulated firm's opportunities to
sell access services. This, in turn, depends on the nature of alterna-
tives that exist to LEC access services. The value of this opportunity
foregone is the essence of an imputation policy, since it indicates the
maximum amount that regulation should require to be imputed to a
downstream, or retail service.
SCENARIO 1: THE COST OF ACCESS SERVICE EQUALS THE COST OF
LONG DISTANCE; No ALTERNATIVES TO ACCESS SERVICE EXIST
If for each minute of LEC long distance sold, the LEC foregoes
the opportunity to sell access to an IXC that would have carried the
call, then that LEC should not sell long distance below a level that
recognizes this lost contribution. The contribution that would be
earned by the LEC in providing access services to IXCs is foregone in
providing intraLATA long distance, and should be considered an op-
portunity cost of providing intraLATA long distance. This scenario
demonstrates this foregone opportunity, and derives a simple price
floor for intraLATA long distance.
LONG
VARIABLE/SERVICE ACCESS DISTANCE
ACCESS PRICE/PRICE FLOOR OF LONG
DISTANCE $.09 $.09
COST TO LEC $.05 $.05
CONTRIBUTION TO LEC $.04 $.04
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. [Vol. 16:1
In this simple scenario it is assumed that access and long distance
are perfect substitutes from the LEC's perspective, that is, any minute
of long distance lost (or gained) by the LEC will necessarily be re-
placed (displaced) by a minute of access. Also, it is noteworthy that
the explicit cost to the LEC of providing access is the same as that of
providing long distance.
The key question is: What does the LEC give up if it sells in-
traLATA long distance in lieu of access service? The answer to this
question is the basis of determining the proper amount to be imputed
to the cost of intraLATA long distance.
If an IXC carries the long distance call, the LEC receives $.09 in
revenue from access while incurring $.05 in incremental costs of pro-
viding access, thereby generating a contribution of $.04. This is the
contribution that will be foregone by the LEC if it sells intraLATA
long distance in lieu of access.
If, however, the LEC carries the long distance call, $.09 in reve-
nue is produced at an incremental cost of $.05, again yielding a contri-
bution of $.04. At these prices, the LEC is indifferent to selling long
distance and access because each generates $.04 in contribution to the
firm.
Under these conditions, if an imputation policy is considered nec-
essary, the proper imputation process would add the $.04 in foregone
contribution from access to the direct incremental cost of long dis-
tance (i.e., $.05) to yield a full opportunity cost to the LEC of selling
long distance (i.e., $.09). However, a forced imputation policy is re-
dundant to the LEC's own incentives. The LEC will not voluntarily
price long distance below $.09, because at a lower price (e.g., $.08) for
each additional unit of LEC long distance sold, the LEC would gener-
ate $.03 in contribution but would lose $.04 in contribution from ac-
cess. Therefore, below $.09 the LEC unambiguously prefers to sell
access (which generates the higher contribution) rather than long
distance.9'
90. Even those parties proposing imputation rules have implied this argument. See,
e.g., In re General Investigation into IntraLATA Competition within the State of Kansas:
Hearings on Docket No. 181,097-U Before the Corporation Commission of the State of Kan-
sas, at 41 (June 10, 1992) (prefiled testimony of MCI witness Timothy J. Gates) ("[I]f
[Southwestern Bell Telephone Company's] access and billing and collection services pro-
vide more contribution than its toll services, [Southwestern Bell Telephone Company]
would be better off providing access in lieu of intraLATA toll."); In re Application of MCI
Telecomm. Corp., In re Application of AT&T Communications of the Southwest, Inc., In re
Applicant of GTE Sprint Communications Corp., In re Inquiry of the Oklahoma Corpora-
tion Comm'n Concerning the Provision and Regulation of Competitive IntraLATA
Telecomm. Servs: Hearings on Cause No. 28713, Cause No. 28696, Cause No. 28780, &
Cause No. PUD 001159 Before the Corporation Commission of the State of Oklahoma, at
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If IXCs are as efficient as the LEC in selling long distance (i.e., if
their costs exceed access charges by no more than $.01), then the LEC
actually loses contribution by trying to squeeze an equally efficient
IXC out of the market. Such a squeeze would require a price for long
distance less than $.09, which would divert long distance traffic away
from the IXCs to the LEC, resulting in lost contribution. In essence, a
price so low as to drive an efficient IXC from the intraLATA segment
of the market would yield a lower level of contribution from the com-
bination of intraLATA long distance and/or access. Obviously, this
would be a business mistake. Hence, a price squeeze is irrational and
therefore unlikely in this scenario, since the LEC must lose money to
engage in one.
In this scenario, the LEC would not choose to sell long distance
below $.09 per minute and an imputation rule is unnecessary. Two
imputation rules, if implemented, are economically sound and
equivalent here:
1. The access price is the lower bound price of long distance.
2. An imputation policy should impute foregone contribution to
long distance cost (.04 + $.05 = $.09).
SCENARIO 2: COST OF ACCESS SERVICE EXCEEDS COST OF LONG
DISTANCE; No ALTERNATIVES TO ACCESS SERVICE EXIST
LONG
VARIABLE/SERVICE ACCESS DISTANCE
ACCESS PRICE/PRICE FLOOR OF LONG
DISTANCE $.09 $.08
COST TO LEC $.06 $.05
CONTRIBUTION TO LEC $.03 $.03
In this simple scenario it is again assumed that access and long
distance are perfect substitutes from the LEC's perspective. In other
words, any minute of long distance lost or gained by the LEC will
necessarily be replaced or displaced by a minute of access. It is also
assumed that the cost to the LEC of providing access is greater than
that of providing long distance; this may be due to features of network
design that cause the cost of providing access externally to IXCs to be
greater than that of providing it internally. In essence, it is assumed
that the LEC provision of long distance is more efficient than the
LEC provision of access in combination with IXC provision of long
distance.
37 (Apr. 2, 1992) [hereinafter Oklahoma Hearings] (prefiled testimony of MCI witness
Timothy J. Gates) ("If the contribution from access is greater, for instance, than the contri-
bution the LEC received from toll, the LEC would be better off selling access and letting
the IXC carry the toll.").
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If an IXC carries the long distance call, the LEC receives $.09 in
revenue from access while incurring $.06 in incremental costs of pro-
viding access, thereby generating a contribution of $.03. This is the
contribution that will be foregone by the LEC if it sells intraLATA
long distance in lieu of access.
If, however, the LEC carries the long distance call, no less than
$.08 in revenue is produced at an incremental cost of $.05, again yield-
ing a contribution of $.03. At these prices, the LEC is again at the
razor's edge of indifference between selling long distance and access
because each generates $.03 in contribution to the firm.
Under these conditions, if an imputation policy is considered nec-
essary, the proper imputation process would add the $.03 in foregone
contribution from access to the direct incremental cost of long dis-
tance (i.e., $.05) to yield a full opportunity cost to the LEC of selling
long distance (i.e., $.08).
In this instance, given perfect information, the LEC would not
price long distance below $.08 per minute. It is assumed that the LEC
is a more efficient provider of long distance than the IXCs. The eco-
nomically correct imputation rule is to include an imputed cost that
does not exceed the foregone contribution (i.e., $.03) to long distance
cost (i.e., $.05) for a total of $.08 per minute.
SCENARIO 3: COST OF LONG DISTANCE EXCEEDS COST OF ACCESS
SERVICE; No ALTERNATIVES TO ACCESS SERVICE EXIST
LONG
VARIABLE/SERVICE ACCESS DISTANCE
ACCESS PRICE/PRICE FLOOR OF LONG
DISTANCE $.05 $.07
COST TO LEC $.03 $.05
CONTRIBUTION TO LEC $.02 $.02
In this scenario, the cost to the LEC of providing long distance
exceeds the cost of providing access. Here the LEC would never
choose to price long distance below $.07 per minute. The economi-
cally correct imputation rule is for imputation not to exceed the fore-
gone contribution from access, yielding a price floor of $.07 (add $.02
to $.05 for a price floor of $.07 per minute) for intraLATA toll.
SCENARIO 4: IXCs CAN BYPASS LEC ACCESS SERVICES
Assume for each minute of LEC long distance sold that, had the
IXC carried the long distance call, it would have carried it over a facil-
ities bypass system, which would have required no LEC access serv-
ices. This assumption is important, since it means that the LEC, in
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this example, does not forego contribution from access for the same
IXC long distance minute.
BYPASS OF LONG
VARIABLE/SERVICE ACCESS SERVICE DISTANCE
ACCESS PRICE/PRICE FLOOR OF LONG
DISTANCE $.?? $.05
COST TO LEC $.00 $.05
CONTRIBUTION TO LEC $.00 $.00
Again, the question that serves as the basis of an imputation pol-
icy is: What does the LEC give up if it sells intraLATA long distance
in lieu of access service?
If an IXC carries the long distance call, the LEC receives no reve-
nue from access, but incurs no costs of providing access. This gener-
ates no contribution. Thus, the LEC foregoes no contribution if it
sells intraLATA long distance in lieu of access.
If, however, the LEC carries the long distance call, no less than
$.05 in revenue is produced at an incremental cost of $.05, again yield-
ing no contribution (at the minimum). At these prices, the LEC is
again indifferent between selling long distance and access because
neither generates contribution to the firm.
Under these conditions, if an imputation policy is considered nec-
essary, the proper imputation process would add the $.00 in foregone
contribution from access to the direct incremental cost of long dis-
tance (i.e., $.05) to yield a full opportunity cost to the LEC of selling
long distance (i.e., $.05). Thus, in this scenario, the LEC would adhere
to a price floor of $.05 per minute. The economically correct imputa-
tion rule is to impute the foregone contribution (which in this instance
is zero) to the long distance cost (add $.00 to $.05, for a price floor of
$.05 per minute).
This is an example in which a formulaic imputation policy, codi-
fied into law via state statutes or public utility commission orders,
makes no sense unless it allows the LEC to impute nothing to the
price of long distance under the proper circumstances (in this case,
bypass).91
91. Ameritech (one of the seven Regional Bell Operating Companies, RBOCs) ap-
pears to have applied this principle. Ameritech Asks Justice to Support InterLATA Relief,
Seeks Waiver for Illinois Service Trial in 1995, TELECOMMUNICATIONS REPORTS, Dec. 13,
1993, at 1 ("'[T] here are exceptions to this rule.' Specifically, the rule will not apply 'where
competitive alternatives to Ameritech access are in existence.' 'Where alternative exist for
network access components, Ameritech's prices for interexchange services would not be
less than its long-run incremental costs."').
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Are Imputation Policies Pointless?
From the perspective of both microeconomic analysis and prag-
matism, a legitimate question is: Are imputation policies pointless?
This question is germane, in part, because there may not be a univer-
sally accepted and applicable imputation test. Though the previous
section has established that opportunity costs are the basis of imputa-
tion policies (in terms of arriving at the proper total amount of impu-
tation, and identifying those circumstances in which various amounts
of imputation should be applied), it could be argued that the amounts
to be imputed to downstream goods or services are moot because the
policy itself is pointless. In other words, regardless of the full opportu-
nity costs of supplying a downstream service (including the implicit
opportunity costs of selling the downstream service in lieu of the up-
stream service), one could argue that the amount to be imputed to a
downstream service should not differ from the incremental cost of
that service. This latter approach is often called a gross incremental
cost test, since it is a test of cross-subsidization that matches gross rev-
enues of a service with that service's gross incremental costs. 92 If
gross revenues exceed gross incremental costs, the test is satisfied, and
no cross-subsidies exist.
It may be pointless to apply an imputation policy if it is not clear
which price floor should be applied as a general cost-based test of any
predatory pricing tactic such as a price squeeze, a gross incremental
cost test, or a net incremental cost test.93 As was noted in Section
III.A., the opportunity cost approach is analogous to a net incremen-
tal cost test, the burden test or a net revenue test. In such an ap-
proach, the cross-elastic effects between services must be considered.
However, the net incremental cost standard is not the only economic
cost standard to consider. In fact, the gross incremental cost standard
is more widely known. The gross incremental cost test or standard, as
the name implies, does not consider cross-elastic effects but focuses
entirely on the direct and explicit costs of producing the service in
question.94
92. This test is described in Baumol, Minimum and Maximum Pricing, supra note 80,
at 241-44; and BAUMOL, SuPERFAIRNEss, supra note 79, at 113-20.
93. These were discussed in Section III.A. of this Article.
94. If the gross incremental cost test is the appropriate standard for imputation, then
the proper lower bound for pricing the downstream service in the numerical examples in
Section III.C. will change. The lower bound for pricing will be as follows: Scenario 1, $.05
rather than $.09; Scenario 2, $.05 rather than $.08; Scenario 3, $.05 rather than $.07; while
in Scenario 4 the two rules will be equivalent at $.05. Clearly, if the gross test is appropri-
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In discussions of the appropriate cost standard for evaluating
predatory pricing, Professors Areeda and Baumol discussed this issue
in 1986 and concluded that the gross incremental cost test is superior
as a means of testing fairness to competitors (i.e., testing for predatory
conduct).95 Since an imputation policy is, by definition, a regulation-
mandated net incremental cost test for the downstream service, one
could easily use the 1986 position of Professors Areeda and Baumol to
argue that imputation makes no sense because it is the same as the
misapplication of a net incremental cost test as a means of testing for
predation. This aspect of imputation policy, however, remains an
open and troubling question in economic literature, particularly since
Professor Baumol's more recent support of opportunity cost-based
imputation policies is equivalent to supporting net incremental cost
tests for detecting predation.96 The arguments against embracing such
a policy are as persuasive now as they were in 1986.
One can analogize the opportunity cost-based price floor that
serves as the basis of an imputation policy to the discounted cash flow
analysis firms often use in assessing business decisions such as capital
budgeting, for both depend heavily on assumptions and predictions
that are by no means certain, but central to the outcome of the analy-
sis. This poses problems for imputation policies, which require net
costs, including implicit opportunity costs, to be taken into account in
determining whether a given price is justified. Actual opportunity
costs, however, like the present value of a return on a proposed in-
vestment, are not always quantifiable with a high degree of statistical
ate, a net incremental cost test/opportunity cost-based rule will overstate the appropriate
lower bound in many cases.
95. See BAUMOL, SUPERFAIRNESS, supra note 79, at 118-20. Assume that there are
two products, Product i and Product j, to use Baumol's notation. Assume that Product j is
produced by firm A. If firm A then adds Product i to its product line as well, what does
Product i add to firm A's profits? "[I]t actually contributes to company revenues not a
figure equal to its own earnings but that minus any associated reduction in the company's
other revenues." Id. at 118. To credit Product i with incremental revenues equal to Prod-
uct i's gross revenues "would then seem to be a distortion of the facts." Id.
Areeda's argument in support of the gross incremental cost test would proceed as
follows. If Product i were produced by one firm, A, while Product j were produced by
another firm, B, and the introduction of Product i were to reduce the volume sold and/or
price of Product j, the resulting loss in firm B's revenues would not be deducted from the
gross revenues of Product i in determining whether the price of Product i is unacceptably
low. Id. "Thus, there is no reason to do so if [Product] j is produced by firm A itself rather
than by B." Id. Furthermore, Areeda argues that "if firm C is a competitor of A in the
production of i but C does not produce j, then any loss in revenues from j ascribable to the
introduction of product i does not harm C and so is not relevant to the issue of the fairness
to competitors of [the price of i]." Id.
96. See generally WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & J. GREGORY SIDAK, TOWARD COMPETITION
IN LOCAL TELEPHONY, 93-116 (1994).
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precision. Thus, any decision to provide a given service which takes
full opportunity costs into account is, like a decision to invest based on
the discounted value of an investment's returns, an exercise by the
firm of its business judgement. Once this is recognized, one can argue
quite convincingly that an imputation requirement is "micro manage-
ment" by a regulatory agency, for most unregulated firms would quite
likely have trouble defending their internal decision-making methods
in a regulatory hearing. In this sense, an imputation policy is
equivalent to outlawing imperfect business judgment, since it requires
that the price of a service not fall below the cost of providing that
service. It mandates an accounting subject to regulatory review for all
opportunity costs of a business decision because, as discussed above, it
is the net costs of providing a service which must be taken into ac-
count when measuring the cost of providing that service. In this sense,
imputation policies are pointless because no firm, regulated or not,
would knowingly set prices that ignore reasonably estimated opportu-
nity costs.
As Section III demonstrated, when IXCs have no alternatives to
the LECs' access service, the incremental contribution that would be
earned by an LEC in providing access services to IXCs is foregone
when an LEC provides a downstream service such as intraLATA long
distance, and this incremental contribution should be included when
measuring the full opportunity cost of providing intraLATA long dis-
tance. As the underlying basis of a generic imputation policy, the
proper economic price floor is composed of two key elements: the
incremental costs of providing the downstream service (intraLATA
long distance, in the above examples), and the contribution foregone
from not selling the upstream productive input (access services, in the
above examples).97 In essence, the LEC should impute the foregone
contribution from access services when such contribution is displaced
by selling intraLATA long distance.
The contribution foregone differs with various circumstances;
hence, there is no single rule that will apply to a wide variety of situa-
tions. For example, a state public utility commission order or state
statute requiring the cost of access to be imputed to the price of in-
traLATA long distance may make no sense, depending on the alterna-
97. This is the primary conclusion of Timothy J. Tardiff & William E. Taylor, Pricing
the Competitive Services of Local Telephone Companies (May 1991) (unpublished manu-
script, National Economic Research Associates, Working Paper #7) (on file with the au-
thors); see BAUMOL & SIDAK, supra note 96; Alfred E. Kahn, An Economic Evaluation of
the Issues Relating to the Terms of Interconnection Provided to Clear Communication by
Telecom New Zealand, at 6-7 (Apr. 27, 1992) (prefiled testimony of Telecom New Zealand
witness Alfred E. Kahn) (on file with the authors).
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tives available to LEC access service. The proper amount of
imputation will differ for intraLATA long distance, depending on the
amount of contribution that must be foregone if access services are
not sold in lieu of intraLATA long distance. If there are alternatives
to the LEC intermediate productive inputs that downstream competi-
tors require, that is, if there is competition in the market for access
services, then this foregone contribution may be zero.
There are, however, legitimate questions as to the efficacy of any
net incremental cost test as a test of predatory conduct, regardless of
full opportunity costs. Since an imputation policy is, by definition, a
net incremental cost test, and is usually argued to be necessary as a
means of preventing predatory conduct, there is a persuasive argu-
ment in the microeconomics literature that indicates imputation poli-
cies probably are pointless.98 The test of predatory conduct Baumol
proposed after his discussions with Areeda consisted of a gross incre-
mental cost test, which requires that the gross incremental revenues of
a service equal or exceed its own gross incremental costs.99 In carry-
ing out the test, the incremental cost figures for service i should con-
tain no deduction for an associated decrease in the production of
some other service j (i.e., this test ignores the opportunity cost of pro-
viding a given service). Gross incremental cost is that increase in cost
of a given service i with all other inputs held constant.
All of this raises several questions: Should imputation policies be
developed or implemented specifically to handle concerns of price
squeezes in telecommunications? Is the competitive process in a mar-
ket harmed somehow, or made "unfair," if a vertically integrated firm
does not charge itself the same amounts it charges firms purchasing
productive inputs from it? What of recent policies designed to foster
competition in telecommunications, such as expanded interconnection
and collocation-are these policies somehow incomplete if imputation
of interconnection charges is not a part of them?
From an economic perspective, a price squeeze is an irrational
pricing strategy for a network-based, regulated firm such as a tele-
phone company. The intraLATA long distance market, which re-
quires intraLATA long distance carriers to purchase access service
from LECs as a productive input, serves as a good illustrative exam-
ple. First, if rivals of LECs in an intraLATA long distance market
were eliminated, to whom would the predator LEC sell access serv-
ices? It is not a foregone conclusion that a vertically integrated firm
would have an incentive to drive all competitors out of a downstream
98. BAUMOL, SUPERFAIRNESS, supra note 79, at 119-20.
99. Id.
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market since those same competitors are its customers for the up-
stream productive input.
Second, to complete such an anticompetitive pricing strategy suc-
cessfully, a firm would need virtually unlimited and unchallenged up-
ward pricing flexibility for the upstream (wholesale) productive input
(such as access services), followed later by the same level of pricing
flexibility for the downstream (retail) service. Economic regulation of
public utilities, regulatory lag, and the regulatory scrutiny of prices
collectively preclude a successful price squeeze. Also, such a pricing
strategy could not go undetected, because if IXCs exited the in-
traLATA long distance market segment, IXCs would disclose this re-
sult and state regulatory agencies would take note.
Third, the nature of regulatory constraints makes it difficult or
impossible for a regulated firm to engage in a profit-neutral plan that
would allow the low pricing of intraLATA long distance and the high
pricing of access services." It is not a foregone conclusion that a reg-
ulatory constraint allows a profit-neutral anticompetitive pricing strat-
egy. In fact, such a pricing strategy would most likely be costly in
terms of lost contribution, with no way to recoup these losses (i.e., a
profit-neutral anticompetitive pricing strategy is most likely to be
mathematically impossible; one would most likely observe contribu-
tion lost due to such pricing).
In addition, it is analytically useful to consider the similarities be-
tween an anticompetitive price squeeze and predatory pricing. For
the price squeeze to be effective, the price set by the integrated firm
for its downstream service must fall below the cost of that same inte-
grated firm offering the service. Therefore, one can consider the price
squeeze as a special case of predatory pricing.
Predatory pricing is generally considered to be the pricing of a
product below marginal cost to drive rivals out of business, and
100. The nature of a regulatory constraint is very important to this analysis. If a firm is
profit-constrained, as is the case in standard-rate base-rate of return regulation, then in
theory it is possible to trade profits from one service in dollar-for-dollar fashion with those
of another. Changing the prices of one service upward, while changing those of another
service downward can, in theory, allow profit to remain unchanged. In real industrial mar-
kets, however, regulatory lag and the fact that a price squeeze would not likely go unde-
tected make this theoretical consideration quite remote.
Theoretically, only one set of prices can maximize profits for the price cap-regulated
firm. See generally Monson & Larson, supra note 48. This set of prices will not likely
conform to the price squeeze scenario. Further, it is axiomatic that changing prices to
engineer a price squeeze scenario will reduce short term profits for a price cap-regulated
firm. Thus, under a price cap regulatory regime, predatory tactics such as price squeezes
are most likely to reduce the regulated firm's profits and the firm will be unable to recoup
these losses.
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thereby earn supernormal profits on higher priced sales. In essence,
the classical predatory pricing model requires three specific actions or
phases: (1) the "rival-bashing" phase, which entails a price reduction
of the final product below marginal cost, (2) the exit phase, which
entails the elimination, and hence exit of rivals, and (3) the recoup-
ment phase, which entails the recoupment of prior losses through
price increases to levels greater than before. 1°1
Although there are models in the game-theoretic economics liter-
ature which conclude that predatory episodes can occur in equilibrium
102 thunder certain assumptions, in general the more mainstream argu-
ments and analyses appearing in the legal academic literature con-
clude that predation is generally irrational and seldom occurs. °3 In
addition, with regard to the potential for a price squeeze in the in-
traLATA long distance market, phase two (the elimination of a rival)
would seem to be especially difficult or impossible. The advent of in-
101. To be predatory, it is generally agreed that a price must be below the short-
run profit maximizing level and must discipline or destroy rivals such that the
predator thereafter gains sustained excess (that is, monopoly) profits far larger
than those lost during the rival-bashing period. The uncertain future gains must
greatly exceed the present actual losses to overcome the uncertainty that rivals
will be destroyed or disciplined and that monopoly profits can be reaped in the
face of future entry. If rivals survive or entry occurs, not only will predation be
unsuccessful, but that very prospect reduces the likelihood that a challenged low
price is in fact predatory.
Phillip Areeda, Monopolization, Mergers and Markets: A Century Past and the Future, 75
CAL. L. REV. 959, 965 (1987). This definition was adopted in Indiana Grocery, Inc. v.
Super Value Stores, Inc., 864 F.2d 1409, 1415 (7th Cir. 1989).
102. See Janusz A. Ordover et al., Equilibrium Vertical Foreclosure, 80 AM. ECON. REV.
127 (1990). Other game-theoretic models of predation are described and discussed in John
Roberts, Battles for Market Share: Incomplete Information, Aggressive Strategic Pricing,
and Competitive Dynamics, ADVANCES IN ECONOMIC THEORY: FIFr WORLD CONGRESS
157 (Jean-Michel Grandmont & Charles F. Manski eds., 1987); Paul Milgrom & John Rob-
erts, Informational Asymmetries, Strategic Behavior, and Industrial Organization, 77 AM.
ECON. REV. 184 (1987); and JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION
361-88 (1988). See also Alexander C. Larson & William E. Kovacic, Predatory Pricing
Safeguards in Telecommunications Regulation: Removing Impediments to Competition, 35
ST. Louis U. L.J. 1, 7-8, 30-33 (1990).
103. Even Areeda and Turner contend that predation is rare. Areeda & Turner, supra
note 59, at 699. Authors arguing that predatory pricing is so rare and irrational that anti-
trust law should ignore it include: ROBERT BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX (1978);
Frank H. Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategies, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 263
(1981); John S. McGee, Predatory Price Cutting: The Standard Oil (N.J.) Case, 1 J.L. &
ECON. 137 (1958); John S. McGee, Predatory Pricing Revisited, 23 J.L. & ECON. 289 (1980).
See also Ronald H. Koller II, The Myth of Predatory Pricing: An Empirical Study, in THE
COMPETITIVE ECONOMY 418 (Yale Brozen ed., 1975); Kenneth G. Elzinga, Predatory Pric-
ing: The Case of the Gunpowder Trust, in THE COMPETITIVE ECONOMY 405 (Yale Brozen
ed., 1975); James D. Hurwitz & William E. Kovacic, Judicial Analysis of Predation: The
Emerging Trends, 35 VAND. L. REV. 63 (1982); Wesley J. Liebeler, Whither Predatory Pric-
ing? From Areeda and Turner to Matsushita, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1052 (1986).
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traLATA long distance competition 1 4 is a relatively recent event in
telecommunications for most states, °5 and some states still prohibit it.
In the states for which intraLATA long distance competition is al-
lowed, the long distance carriers (i.e., interexchange carriers, or IXCs)
contend that intraLATA traffic accounts for a very small proportion
of their total long distance traffic.'" In essence, the IXCs have ex-
isting switches, networks, and marketing plans that are not based on
intraLATA revenues. A local exchange company could not, there-
fore, eliminate the IXCs as long distance service providers because
they exist without carrying any intraLATA traffic.
Consider an especially expansive definition of "being driven out
of the market" as an instant in time when an IXC has no existing
intraLATA traffic. Even under this definition, predation cannot be
successful because phase three, the recoupment stage, could not oc-
cur. When the LEC attempted to raise intraLATA prices, the IXCs
would have facilities available for intraLATA use and tariffs in place,
ready to recapture intraLATA customers. The current and future
IXC interLATA facilities would be ready to provide intraLATA serv-
ices. This would create a constant competitive vulnerability to the
LECs, a constant competitive opportunity for the IXCs, and condi-
tions sufficient to preclude predation.
Other practical limitations make a price squeeze by an LEC for
intraLATA long distance highly unlikely. First, the squeeze would re-
quire initial increases in IXC access rates, initial reductions in LEC
long distance rates and subsequent greater increases in LEC long dis-
tance rates. This demands far greater pricing latitude for the LEC
than is generally provided by state commissions. Second, the state
public utility commission or the IXCs being squeezed out of the mar-
ket would likely detect the attempt to engage either in predatory be-
havior or in a price squeeze.
Proponents of the price squeeze or other predatory tactics in tele-
communications have provided numerical examples that purport to
104. "Competition" as used here refers to the official allowance of interexchange carri-
ers to carry traffic within the LATA. In most jurisdictions the local exchange companies
continue to retain the 1+ dialing advantage while simultaneously being restricted from pro-
viding interLATA traffic and facing other regulatory disadvantages.
105. Herb Kirchhoff, Intra-LATA Toll Competition (1991) (Telecom Publishing Group,
on file with the authors).
106. Oklahoma Hearings, supra note 90, at 4 (prefiled testimony of AT&T witness Rob-
ert J. Flappan) ("For 18 states where intraLATA competition is authorized and data is




indicate price squeezes or otherwise predatory incentives.10 7 How-
ever these examples are conceptually flawed, generally in one of two
ways. First, the price-squeezing price, when examined carefully, may
yield a lower contribution or profit level for the LEC than the non-
price squeezing price. Second, the example may only demonstrate
that a less efficient (more costly) IXC would actually be squeezed out
of the market. This would not constitute an example of an anticompe-
titive price squeeze; rather, the exit of less efficient rivals demon-
strates the workings of the competitive process.
Thus, it seems reasonable that the ability to engineer even the
common, anecdotal rendition of a price squeeze does not exist in
modern regulated telecommunications markets. Even if regulation
were absent and telephone companies could engage in the type of
price squeeze that was originally identified in Alcoa, such cases are
neither proven to be an important source of antitrust litigation in un-
regulated industries; nor, apparently, are they considered a serious an-
ticompetitive problem.0 8  As indicated earlier, the relative
importance of such cases as sources of antitrust litigation in the elec-
tric power industry is diminishing.
V
Summary and Conclusions
An imputation policy is a regulatory policy employed when a ver-
tically integrated (i.e., end-to-end) regulated firm sells intermediate
productive inputs in an upstream market to its own competitors in an
end-user, or downstream market. Imputation policies may be de-
scribed in two ways. First, such policies set regulation-enforced price
floors for the end-user product or service, such as intraLATA long
distance. Second, such policies require regulatory agencies to decide
on an internal price for the intermediate productive good that its ver-
tically integrated supplier must implicitly charge or "impute" itself,
when using this intermediate good as an input in servicing the down-
stream market. Thus, an example of an imputation policy is the prac-
tice of ensuring that an LEC charges itself access charges when
supplying intrastate intraLATA long distance service.
Imputation policies are sometimes used by state regulatory agen-
cies to ensure that fair competition can take place in state telecommu-
107. See In re Southwestern Bell Telephone's Application for Classification of Certain
Services as Transitionally Competitive: Hearings on Case No. TO-93-116 Before the Public
Service Commission of the State of Missouri, at 12-18 (Nov. 12, 1992) (prefiled testimony of
Sprint Communications Company L. P. witness Mark P. Sievers) (on file with the authors).
108. Joskow, supra note 22, at 188.
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nications markets. Several state public utility commissions have
ordered LECs to impute to themselves the rates of services sold in
upstream markets to downstream LEC competitors. The reason usu-
ally advanced in support of imputation policies is that they are neces-
sary to prevent potential cross-subsidization or anticompetitive price
squeeze strategies harmful to competition in downstream markets.
Such concerns about vertically integrated firms are not new, hav-
ing surfaced in the courts and in regulatory proceedings for many
years, especially in antitrust litigation involving the electric power in-
dustry since the Supreme Court's 1976 decision in Federal Power
Comm'n v. Conway Corp.'0 9 A key question, therefore, about impu-
tation policies is whether they actually benefit the competitive process
in telecommunications markets as regulators expect; or whether such
policies produce price floors that harm true competition on the merits
by impeding the legitimate competitive pricing responses of the LECs
(or other firms subject to imputation).
Most regulatory agencies imposing a policy of imputation con-
sider the potential for an anticompetitive price squeeze as a reason for
having such policies."' This Article concludes that the incentive to
engage in a price squeeze in telecommunications markets is economi-
cally irrational, and hence unlikely. An efficient, integrated utility's
prices are likely to squeeze only those downstream market suppliers
who operate less efficiently than the utility, and whose existence in the
long term does not foster the competitive process in downstream mar-
kets. Consequently, an imputation policy may be counterproductive,
in other words, "more likely to discourage efficient operations and
deprive customers of prices that reflect lower costs than to preserve
competition and protect consumers.""'
This Article also concludes that imputation is an overly stringent
safeguard against alleged anticompetitive price squeeze practices,
whose likelihood can reasonably be considered quite small in the first
place. Depending on the way in which they are implemented, imputa-
tion policies may actually do more to hamper earnest competition on
the merits than to foster it. This is because they may cause regulatory
price floors to be too high to allow the legitimate competitive re-
sponses of vertically integrated LECs (which may have significant pro-
ductive efficiencies due to scale and scope economies). Imputation
policies, if perpetuated in economically inefficient ways in important
future public policies (e.g., collocation or unbundling in state telecom-
109. 426 U.S. 271 (1976).
110. Supra note 24.
111. Rowley, supra note 55, at 410.
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munications regulation) may cause public policy to ignore the eco-
nomic efficiencies inherent in vertically integrated local exchange
carriers, to the detriment of true competition, and ultimately to the
detriment of telecommunications service purchasers.
In implicitly selling intermediate productive inputs to itself to
produce downstream services, a vertically integrated firm should not
necessarily charge itself the same price for inputs that it charges to
other firms on the open market, as dictated by economic efficiency.
Similarly, from an economic perspective, a vertically integrated firm
does not have an incentive to depress the price floor of the down-
stream service simply because it provides the upstream input. If an
LEC, for example, is the only supplier of some intermediate produc-
tive input, and it also sells service to the downstream market, then it
has two choices: (1) it can sell the downstream service directly to cus-
tomers in the downstream market, or (2) it can sell only the intermedi-
ate good to its other downstream competitors who will service the
downstream market in lieu of the LEC.
Given these two choices, and if the LEC is the only supplier of
the intermediate good, then the internal price floor it would select for
itself would have two components: the explicit incremental cost of
producing the downstream service, plus the contribution which could
have been obtained by selling the intermediate productive input to an
alternative supplier (which will, in turn, sell the downstream service in
lieu of the LEC). If imputation is considered a necessary public pol-
icy, and if ad hoc rules may be codified in state statutes of state public
utility commission orders, then this price floor should serve as the ba-
sis of regulatory imputation policies.
This Article concludes that specific imputation policies are unnec-
essary and wasteful of resources. Given that the terms of service pro-
vision and service prices are set by regulatory agencies, imputation
policies are redundant with regulatory constraints and with the regu-
lated firm's own economic incentives to maximize its profits.
If, however, an imputation mechanism must be instituted, an eco-
nomically correct mechanism would be defined as follows. The only
component of a price floor that a regulatory policy should require a
vertically integrated supplier to impute to itself is the foregone contri-
bution from selling the downstream service in lieu of the intermediate
productive input. This implicit cost may take on several different val-
ues depending on the structure of the market. For example, if the
vertically integrated supplier is the only source of the intermediate
productive input, then the opportunity cost is the contribution fore-
gone due to selling the downstream service in lieu of the intermediate
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good. If, however, the vertically integrated supplier is but one sup-
plier in a competitive upstream market, the opportunity cost of selling
the downstream service in lieu of the intermediate productive input
may be zero. In this case, nothing should be imputed to the price
floor of the downstream service over and above its own incremental
cost.
Between these two extremes, the answer is unclear, for the op-
portunity cost is not zero, but falls short of the full contribution to
overhead foregone due to selling the downstream service in lieu of the
intermediate good. It becomes an empirical question, though infor-
mation asymmetries and the dynamics of the telecommunications in-
dustry would make the empirical analysis involved rather difficult, and
hence impractical.
The price floor proposed here as a basis of imputation policies, if
mandated, is not new. It is the same as the well-known burden test of
cross-subsidies from the regulatory economics literature (which is also
known as a net incremental cost test). It is also equivalent in concept
to the FCC's net revenue test and several well-known transfer pricing
rules from the microeconomics and accounting literatures," 2 and was
recommended by Tardiff and Taylor in 1991."1
If imputation policies are considered necessary by telecommuni-
cations regulatory agencies, then such policies based on this price
floor would encourage true competitive responses on the merits by
vertically integrated regulated firms.
112. See, e.g., Jack Hirshleifer, On the Economics of Transfer Pricing, 29 J. Bus. 172
(1956) (arguing that market price is the correct transfer price only if the commodity being
transferred is produced in a competitive market; if the market is imperfectly competitive,
or if no market for the transferred commodity exists, the correct transfer price is marginal
cost, or some price between marginal cost and market price); Mohamed Onsi, A Transfer
Pricing System Based on Opportunity Cost, 45 Accr. REV. 535 (1970) (transfer price of
commodity X1 should consist of the variable cost of X, plus the contribution that produc-
tion of X1 causes to be foregone from commodity X2); Larson & Parsons, supra note 50.
113. Tardiff & Taylor, supra note 97.
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Appendix 1:
A Discussion of the Ordover-Sykes-Willig Model
Based on the Ordover-Sykes-Willig (OSW) analysis and analytic
framework, several useful inferences can be made. Assume, like
OSW, that a firm sells two products. These products are called Com-
ponent 1 and Component 2, and are used jointly as a system, much
like various telecommunications network services are today. A "sys-
tem" is defined as one unit each of Components 1 and 2.
Assume that Firm A is the only seller of Component 1, which
OSW calls Al. Firm A produces Al at a unit cost of c. Assume, how-
ever, that there are several producers and sellers of Component 2,
including Firm A. The cost to produce Component A2 is aA, for B2 it
is aB, etc. Assuming all customers are willing to pay b for a complete
system, the maximum profit will be no higher than b - (c + a), where a
is the lowest cost of Component 2.
Thus, we have the case of a perfect price squeeze, because b is the
monopoly price of a system, and Firm A is not regulated in any way.
In this situation, how would Firm A behave so as to extract the maxi-
mum profit from selling Component 1, Component 2, or both? Would
it attempt to foreclose competition in the downstream market?
Would a policy of imputation yield any benefits to the public? If not,
what regulatory policy would?
SCENARIO 1: FIRM A SELLS ONLY COMPONENT 1. First, consider a
scenario in which Firm A chooses to produce only Component 1
(which it produces at a cost of c). It sets the price for Al at (b - a)
(i.e., the price customers are willing to pay, less the cost other firms
must pay to produce Component 2). In so doing, Firm A's maximum
profits per system can be no higher than b - (a + c).
SCENARIO 2: FIRM A CHOOSES A "TYING" STRATEGY. Consider a
scenario in which Firm A chooses to sell both components, but will
only sell them as a system. Thus, it refuses to sell Component 1 to any
other firm, essentially setting a de facto infinite price for the compo-
nent. No other producer of Component 2 may purchase Component 1
from Firm A. To extract maximum profits, Firm A will sell systems at
a price of b, and again, its maximum profits per system can be no
higher than b - (a + c).
SCENARIO 3: FIRM A CHOOSES AN "OPEN MARKET" STRATEGY.
Consider a third selling and marketing scenario in which Firm A pro-
duces both components, and sells them separately on the open market
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to anyone wishing to purchase them. To extract maximum profits,
Firm A will charge a price of (b - a) for Component 1, and a price of a
for Component 2. As before, Firm A's maximum profits per system
can be no higher than b - (a + c). Whether it chooses to sell only
Component 1, ties both components, or sells them separately, it will
be no better off. In all three scenarios, it extracts maximum profits by
the way in which it chooses to price Component 1. This result was
also recognized by the Concord court." 4
SCENARIO 4: EFFECT OF REGULATION IN MARKET FOR COMPONENT
1. Consider now another scenario in which the market for Component
I is regulated so that Firm A cannot charge prices as high as (b - a).
Assume that the maximum lawful price for Component 1 is set at Firm
A's economic cost, c. In this situation, the above conclusions do not
change. Whether Firm A chooses any of the above three pricing strat-
egies makes no difference to its profits. In all three cases, Firm A's
maximum profits can be no higher than zero. Regulation shifts Firm
A's economic profits downward to the level of zero, and prevents a
perfect price squeeze. The outcome is what one would expect from a
competitive market.
This latter scenario is important, for it underscores just how
pointless an imputation policy would be. In the unregulated case,
Firm A can charge a price of (b - a) for Component 1, but its cost to
produce Component 1 is c. Thus, it does not "charge itself" a price of
(b - a) the way it does its own competitors (and the way an imputa-
tion policy would require). This is not a problem with Firm A's cho-
sen price floor, or with the lack of an imputation policy. The problem
is a lack of curbs on the upper limits of prices for Component 1, for
which Firm A has market power. The standard remedy for monopoly
pricing, however, is economic regulation in the form of curbs on upper
limits on allowed pricing. Once it is imposed, Firm A's economic
profits are zero and there is no difference between Firm A's prices
and economic costs (which differ from accounting costs because they
include the opportunity cost of capital) of Component 1.
An imputation policy would not be helpful in this situation, since
it is an explicit price floor, not a ceiling.
SCENARIO 5: EFFECT OF A MORE EFFICIENT SUPPLIER OF COMPO-
NENT 2. What would be the result if we again assumed that no regula-
114. See Town of Concord v. Boston Edison Co., 915 F.2d 17, 32 (1st Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 499 U.S. 931 (1991) (citing 3 PHILLIP AREEDA & DONALD TURNER, ANTITRUST
LAW 728b, at 199 (1978)).
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tion were imposed on the market for Component 1, and assume that
another firm can produce Component 2 more efficiently than Firm A
does? In this case, Firm A still has an incentive to select the most
efficient supplier of Component 2. For example, assume that Firm A
were to attempt a tying strategy in which it refuses to sell Component
1 on the open market, and only sells Component 1 with its own Com-
ponent 2, which it produces at a cost of at. It will sell systems for b,
and its maximum profit per system will be b - ( c + aA). If, however,
Firm A chose instead to sell only Component 1 at a price of b - aB,
and purchase Component 2 from the more efficient supplier, then its
profits could be even higher, topping out at b - (aB + c) per system.
Thus, there would be no point to tying.
SCENARIO 6: EFFECT OF A COMPETITOR IN THE MARKET FOR COM-
PONENT 1. Suppose Firm A were to face competition in the market
for Component 1, and competitor Firm D produces Component 1 at a
cost of c' > c, but other firms produce Component 2 at A lower cost
than Firm A. Firm A's maximum profits per system can be no higher
than (c' - c). In this circumstance, a tying strategy does not increase
profits and a proper imputation policy only duplicates the firm's own
incentives.
For example, assume Firm A refuses to sell Component 1 sepa-
rately, but ties the services in a system and sells it at a price just below
aB + c' (the unit cost of an efficient, competing system). The maxi-
mum profits from this selling arrangement, however, are now a little
less than (c' - c)! Thus, in the short term, there is no point to tying as
an exclusionary tactic, since it causes a reduction in profits. This is
true regardless of the existence of an imputation policy.
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